The study examined the impact of privatization on economic growth and income inequality in 82 developing countries between 1991 and 2002. Using the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach, we found that privatization did not have a significant impact on both economic growth and income inequality. However, good governance had a positive impact on economic growth and a negative impact on income inequality, while foreign direct investment (FDI) had a negligible impact on economic growth but a positive effect on income inequality. The findings of the study suggest that country-specific characteristics may be more important in promoting growth and reducing income inequality than any economic policy per se.

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Th is article uses Kaufman ' s theory of competing bureaucratic values as a foundation for studying bureaucratic values in a developing society. It discusses civil service reform within a socio-bureaucratic-political exchange, as well as characteristics associated with bureaucratic values and ethnic federalism. Th e inherent confl icts between a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or executive leadership and practices within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity are explored. Factors related to Ethiopia ' s postconfl ict status, which further complicate the governance environment, are identifi ed, and building blocks for postconfl ict governance are suggested.

Objective. Few studies have examined the determinants of privatization in Sub‐Saharan Africa. This study examined the macroeconomic, political, and institutional factors that drive the privatization process in Sub‐Saharan Africa. Method. We used pooled ordinary least squares regression estimation technique to analyze the determinants of privatization in 22 Sub‐Saharan African countries over a period of 12 years (1991–2002). Results. We found that inflation, income inequality, and the institutional or governance infrastructure are key determinants of privatization in Sub‐Saharan Africa. On the other hand, we did not find democracy and debt to be significantly correlated with privatization. However, countries with high debt levels that were also experiencing high inflation were more likely to privatize. Conclusion. Government leadership and, consequently, politics play a significant role in the privatization decision in Sub‐Saharan African countries.

The idea of representative bureaucracy has provoked an important series of debates in the literature about police personnel management and representation of women and racial minorities. The critical questions in this study are: (a.) Does the sworn police force reasonably reflect a cross section of the groups being policed? and (b.) What factors are considered in representation of women and minority police officers in law-enforcement agencies? Black and Hispanic representation on police forces is closely associated with its presence in community populations. Regions vary in the degree of female and minority representation, blacks being better represented in southern police forces than elsewhere; women are better represented in the northwest. However, findings reveal that men, mostly whites, continue to hold disproportionately more sworn positions in most law-enforcement agencies. The models of female and minority representation also illustrate the degree of female and minority hiring by analyzing four major contributing factors: economic, organizational, demographic, and legal.

By implementing various forms of preference policies, countries around the world intervene in their economies for their own political and economic purposes. Likewise, twenty-five states in the U.S. have implemented in-state preference policies (NASPO, 2012) to protect and support their own vendors from out-of-state competition to achieve similar purposes. The purpose of this paper is to show the connection between protectionist public policy instruments noted in the international trade literature and the in-state preference policies within the United States. This paper argues that the reasons and the rationales for adopting these preference policies in international trade and the states' contexts are similar. Given the similarity in policy outcomes, the paper further argues that the international trade literature provides an overarching explanation to help understand what states could expect in applying in-state preference policies.

This research examined the impact of South Carolina's in-state preference policies on the economy of the state. To achieve this purpose, the research sought to answer the question: what are the impacts of implementing the in-state procurement preference policies on the economy of the state of South Carolina? The question was answered by using seven economic indicators: jobs, personal income, real disposable income, output (sales), Gross State Product (GSP), value added and state's population. The data related to the in-state preference policies were collected from the South Carolina Procurement Services Office. The data was then analyzed using the Regional Economic Model Policy Insight (REMI PI+) for economic-forecasting and policy-analysis. The results revealed the existence of quantitative differences between the baseline, which represents the values of the economic indicators without implementing the preference policies, and the alternative forecast, which represents the values of the economic indicators when implementing the policies. Specifically, the results showed that implementing in-state preference policies presented economic benefits to the state and its communities in the form of additional jobs, income, GSP, value added, population and sales. From 2010 until 2017, the total economic impact of implementing preference policies generated $17 million in total output, 135 total job-years, $10.22

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