Failure to apply lockout procedures for the control of hazardous energies is one of the main causes of machinery-related fatal and serious injuries in North America. The absence of audits of lockout or the lack of proper tools for auditing lockout is prevalent, and thus the application of lockout is often not fully in compliance with standards and regulations. A self-audit tool for the application of lockout procedures for machinery was developed on the basis of the current standards and regulations, and previous research. The tool was then tested for content validity through experts’ opinions and qualitative feedback from six organizations in the province of Quebec in Canada. The developed audit tool defines the actual procedures to audit, as well as the surrounding conditions that are needed and the prerequisites based on standards, regulations, and findings from previous research. The results showed that the tool displayed a high content validity index and demonstrated that the usability, applicability, and comprehensiveness of the tool were adequate. This self-audit tool helps organizations monitor the application of lockout on machinery for the safety of workers and to ensure that the actual practice of controlling hazardous energy is in compliance with relevant standards and regulations.
Industrial machines are known to possess many hazards. There are many laws, regulations, standards and practices that aim at ensuring that machines are safe for different workers performing various tasks including operation and maintenance. Safeguards protect workers by stopping hazardous motion when actuated. Those safeguards are integrated into machinery using two widely used international standards for functional safety. However, these standards have some significant differences although they are both based on similar principles. This paper explores those differences and their potential impacts. Subjectivity in the specification and design of safety systems, based on the differences, can lead to different levels of reliability in the safety systems even when considering the same hazard zone of machinery based on which standard is used.
The ACR-1000™ developed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) is a 1200 MWe - pressure tube type, light-water-cooled and heavy-water-moderated reactor, which has evolved from the well-established CANDU™ line of reactors. It retains the basic proven CANDU design features while incorporating innovations and state-of-the-art technologies to ensure fully competitive safety, operation, performance and economics. The major innovation in the ACR-1000 is the use of slightly enriched uranium fuel and light water coolant. ACR-1000 is a four-quadrant design (for easier maintenance and improved reliability). There are five safety systems in the ACR-1000; (i) two independent, diverse and fast acting shutdown systems (SDS1 and SDS2), which are physically and functionally independent from each other and from the reactor regulating system; (ii) Emergency core cooling system; (iii) Emergency Feedwater system; and (iv) Containment system, which includes a strong steel-lined containment structure. In addition the Reserve water system provides feedwater to the heat transport system, steam generators, moderator and shield cooling system for beyond design basis accidents. The Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is conducted in support of the design phase of the ACR-1000. The purpose of Level 1 PSA is to identify whether the ACR-1000 design targets and the regulatory safety goal for severe core damage frequency (SCDF) are met with adequate margin and provide design feedback. An interim Level 1 PSA was conducted for internal at-power events. Interim assessments were conducted for shutdown state, internal fire and flood at-power events. An interim seismic margin assessment was conducted for the seismic events. The Level 1 PSA results show that the ACR™ design targets and safety goal for SCDF are met with significant safety margin. Based on the ACR-1000 Level 1 PSA, the accident behaviours of the ACR-1000 are well understood and their consequences can be predicted with a high-level of confidence. It also provides sufficient assurance that the release based regulatory safety goals are achievable for ACR-1000. The Level 1 PSA results also signify a robust design that provides a strong foundation for the ACR-1000 design. The paper summarizes the Level 1 PSA program, methodology followed, the results obtained, and insights gained during the development of the ACR-1000 Level 1 PSA.
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