No abstract

What role does deliberation play in susceptibility to political misinformation and "fake news"? The "Motivated System 2 Reasoning" account posits that deliberation causes people to fall for fake news because reasoning facilitates identity-protective cognition and is therefore used to rationalize content that is consistent with one's political ideology. The classical account of reasoning instead posits that people ineffectively discern between true and false news headlines when they fail to deliberate (and instead rely on intuition). To distinguish between these competing accounts, we investigated the causal effect of reasoning on media truth discernment using a two-response paradigm. Participants (N= 1635 MTurkers) were presented with a series of headlines. For each, they were first asked to give an initial, intuitive response under time pressure and concurrent working memory load. They were then given an opportunity to rethink their response with no constraints, thereby permitting more deliberation. We also compared these responses to a (deliberative) one-response baseline condition where participants made a single choice with no constraints. Consistent with the classical account, we found that deliberation corrected intuitive mistakes: subjects believed false headlines (but not true headlines) more in initial responses than in either final responses or the unconstrained 1-response baseline. In contrastand inconsistent with the Motivated System 2 Reasoning accountwe found that political polarization was equivalent across responses. Our data suggest that, in the context of fake news, deliberation facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias.

Influential work on reasoning and decision making has popularized the idea that sound reasoning requires correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower and more demanding deliberation. We present seven studies that question this corrective view of human thinking. We focused on the very problem that has been widely featured as the paradigmatic illustration of the corrective view, the wellknown bat-and-ball problem. A two-response paradigm in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load allowed us to identify the presumed intuitive response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Across our studies we observe that correct final responses are often non-corrective in nature. Many reasoners who manage to answer the bat-and-ball problem correctly after deliberation already solved it correctly when they reasoned under conditions that minimized deliberation in the initial response phase. This suggests that sound bat-and-ball reasoners do not necessarily need to deliberate to correct their intuitions, their intuitions are often already correct. Pace the corrective view, findings suggest that in these cases they deliberate to verify correct intuitive insights.

What are the psychological consequences of the increasingly politicized nature of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States relative to similar Western countries? In a two-wave study completed early (March) and later (December) in the pandemic, we found that polarization was greater in the United States ( N = 1,339) than in Canada ( N = 644) and the United Kingdom. ( N = 1,283). Political conservatism in the United States was strongly associated with engaging in weaker mitigation behaviors, lower COVID-19 risk perceptions, greater misperceptions, and stronger vaccination hesitancy. Although there was some evidence that cognitive sophistication was associated with increased polarization in the United States in December (but not March), cognitive sophistication was nonetheless consistently negatively correlated with misperceptions and vaccination hesitancy across time, countries, and party lines. Furthermore, COVID-19 skepticism in the United States was strongly correlated with distrust in liberal-leaning mainstream news outlets and trust in conservative-leaning news outlets, suggesting that polarization may be driven by differences in information environments.

The COVID-19 pandemic has become more political in the U.S.A. than in similar Western countries, allowing for a novel test of attitude polarization. Furthermore, past work disagrees about the role of cognitive sophistication (relative to ideology) in the formation of science beliefs. We therefore investigated the roles of political ideology and cognitive sophistication in explaining COVID-19 attitudes across the U.S.A. (N=689), the U.K. (N=642), and Canada (N=644). Polarization was greater in the U.S. than in the U.K., but not Canada. Furthermore, in all three countries, cognitive sophistication correlated negatively with misperceptions – and in fact was a stronger predictor than political ideology. We also found no evidence that cognitive sophistication was associated with increased polarization, contrary to identity-protective cognition accounts of motivated reasoning. Thus, although there is some evidence for political polarization, accurate beliefs about COVID-19 were broadly associated with the quality of one’s reasoning regardless of political polarization.

Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the influential dual process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (i.e., choosing the greater good) requires deliberate correction of an intuitive deontological response. In the present article, we present 4 studies that force us to revise this longstanding "corrective" dual process assumption. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response to moral dilemmas under time-pressure and cognitive load. Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Results consistently show that in the vast majority of cases (ϩ70%) in which people opt for a utilitarian response after deliberation, the utilitarian response is already given in the initial phase. Hence, utilitarian responders do not need to deliberate to correct an initial deontological response. Their intuitive response is already utilitarian in nature. We show how this leads to a revised model in which moral judgments depend on the absolute and relative strength differences between competing deontological and utilitarian intuitions.

Dual process models of higher cognition have become very influential in the cognitive sciences. The popular Default-Interventionist model has long favored a serial view on the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processing (or System 1 and System 2). Recent work has led to an alternative hybrid model view in which people's intuitive reasoning performance is assumed to be determined by the absolute and relative strength of competing intuitions. In the present study, we tested unique new predictions to validate the hybrid model. We adopted a two-response paradigm with popular base-rate neglect problems in which baserate information and a stereotypical description could cue conflicting responses. By manipulating the extremity of the base-rates in our problems we aimed to affect the strength of the "logical" intuition that is hypothesized to cue selection of the base-rate response. The two-response paradigm-in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load-allowed us to identify the presumed intuitively generated response. Consistent with the hybrid model predictions, we observed that experimentally reducing the strength of the logical intuition decreased the number of initial base-rate responses when solving problems in which base-rates and stereotypical information conflicted. Critically, reasoners who gave an initial stereotypical response were less likely to register the intrinsic conflict (as reflected in decreased confidence) in this case, whereas reasoners who gave an initial base-rate response registered more conflict. Implications and remaining challenges for dual process theorizing are discussed.

What role does deliberation play in susceptibility to political misinformation and “fake news”? The “Motivated System 2 Reasoning” account posits that deliberation causes people to fall for fake news because reasoning facilitates identity-protective cognition and is therefore used to rationalize content that is consistent with one’s political ideology. The classical account of reasoning instead posits that people ineffectively discern between true and false news headlines when they fail to deliberate (and instead rely on intuition). To distinguish between these competing accounts, we investigated the causal effect of reasoning on media truth discernment using a two-response paradigm. Participants (N= 1635 MTurkers) were presented with a series of headlines. For each, they were first asked to give an initial, intuitive response under time pressure and concurrent working memory load. They were then given an opportunity to re-think their response with no constraints, thereby permitting more deliberation. We also compared these responses to a (deliberative) one-response baseline condition where participants made a single choice with no constraints. Consistent with the classical account, we found that deliberation corrected intuitive mistakes: subjects believed false headlines (but not true headlines) more in initial responses than in either final responses or the unconstrained 1-response baseline. In contrast – and inconsistent with the Motivated System 2 Reasoning account – we found that political polarization was equivalent across responses. Our data suggest that, in the context of fake news, deliberation facilitates accurate belief formation and not partisan bias.