Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Bagó, Bence; Neys, Wim De

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014

Cited by 249 publications

(368 citation statements)

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“…Note that previous studies that reported successful conflict detection with simple AC and MP problems typically ran analyses in which performance over both inference types was collapsed (e.g., Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys et al, 2010; De Neys & Franssens, 2009). Hence, the present results suggest that these effects were primarily driven by the MP inference.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, reasoners who answer intuitively to conflict problems need more time (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014; Villejoubert, 2009; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011), are less confident about their response (Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Gangemi, Bourgeois-Gironde, & Mancini, 2015; Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Thompson & Johnson, 2014) and show increased activation of brain areas assumed to mediate conflict and error monitoring (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Simon, Lubin, Houdé, & De Neys, 2015) compared to when they give the normative answer to the no-conflict ones. These studies thus provide basic evidence for the presence of conflict detection in biased reasoners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To make sure that the initial response is truly intuitive in nature participants are given a short deadline or are imposed a cognitive load task (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017). They are then given as much time as they need to give their final answer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In continuity with previous studies on conflict detection in logical reasoning (Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010) we used simple categorical syllogisms that were first introduced by Markovits and Nantel (1989) and popularized through the work of Stanovich and West (1998, 2000; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008) and others. The first syllogism starts with the premises “All As are Bs; All Cs are As” and leads to the valid conclusion “All Cs are Bs”.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

Schaeken¹,

Markovits²,

Neys

2018

PSYCHOL BELG

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Empirical evidence for the capacity to detect conflict between biased reasoning and normative principles has led to the proposal that reasoners have an intuitive grasp of some basic logical principles. In two studies, we investigate the boundary conditions of these logical intuitions by manipulating the logical complexity of problems where logical validity and conclusion believability conflict or not. Results pointed to evidence for successful conflict detection on the basic Modus Ponens (MP) inference, but also showed evidence for such a phenomenon on the more complex Modus Tollens (MT) inference. This suggests that both the MP and the MT inferences are simple enough for reasoners to have an intuitive grasp of their logical structure. The boundaries of logical intuition might thus reside in problems of greater complexity than these inferences. We also observed that on the invalid Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) inferences, participants showed higher accuracy on the inference that was expected to be more complex (DA), and no evidence for successful conflict detection was found on these forms. Implications for the logical intuition framework are discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

Schaeken¹,

Markovits²,

Neys

2018

PSYCHOL BELG

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…This is empirically supported by evidence that judgments based on formal norms such as logic and probability (traditionally equated with Type 2 processing) may be made quickly and implicitly, suggesting that these judgments may, in some instances, arise from Type 1 processes. For example, recent evidence suggests that some types of simple logical arguments are processed autonomously (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Trippas, Handley, Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016; though see Klauer & Singmann, 2013). Similarly, although belief judgments have been shown to be made rapidly and accurately, it is well established that these involve some form of inferential processing distinct from pure fact-retrieval from memory (Reder, 1982).…”

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confidence: 99%

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

2016

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Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0680-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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How can we apply decision‐making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

Teichroeb,

Smeltzer,

Mathur

et al. 2023

American J Primatol

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Our understanding of decision‐making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision‐making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision‐making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi‐destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision‐making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio‐ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human‐induced rapid environmental change.

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Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Cited by 249 publications

References 50 publications

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

How can we apply decision‐making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

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