The ongoing COVID-19 crisis poses a significant financial risk to the UK higher education sector. Universities are facing big losses across a range of income sources and investments. These losses could cause serious financial problems, including -in the extreme -insolvency. Most institutions will be left with reduced net assets, which could increase financing costs and will leave them less well placed to cope with future adverse shocks.This briefing note examines the resilience of university finances to the likely consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak and the public health response to it. For UK higher education institutions, we estimate the likely financial losses associated with the crisis under three different scenarios, reflecting different crisis trajectories in the coming months. We assess the chances of insolvency and estimate the cost of potential bailouts to the taxpayer.Our main findings are:  The total size of the university sector's losses is highly uncertain: we estimate that long-run losses could come in anywhere between £3 billion and £19 billion, or between 7.5% and nearly half of the sector's overall income in one year. Our central estimate of total long-run losses is £11 billion or more than a quarter of income in one year.

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This report is the third in a series of annual reports on education spending in England. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Nuffield Foundation, which has funded this series of annual reports (grant number EDO/43355). The Nuffield Foundation is an independent charitable trust with a mission to advance educational opportunity and social well-being. It funds research that informs social policy, primarily in Education, Welfare and Justice. It also provides opportunities for young people to develop skills and confidence in science and research. The Nuffield Foundation is the founder and co-funder of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory and the Ada Lovelace Institute. The Nuffield Foundation has funded this project, but the views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the Foundation. For more Schools 1 School spending per pupil in England fell by 9% in real terms between 2009-10 and 2019-20. This represents the largest cut in over 40 years, but it came on the back of a significant increase in spending per pupil of over 60% during the 2000s.2 Over the 2010s, cuts in spending per pupil were lower in Wales (5%), but similar in Northern Ireland (10%). In contrast, spending per pupil in Scotland rose by 5% in real terms over the 2010s, reflecting extra funding to pay for increases in teacher pay totalling more than 10% over 2018 and 2019. Spending per pupil is highest in Scotland (£7,300), at similar levels in Wales and England (£6,100) and lowest in Northern Ireland (£5,800).3 The government has allocated an extra £7.1 billion for schools in England in 2022-23. This will increase spending per pupil by 9% in real terms between 2019-20 and 2022-23 (as measured against expected general inflation) and near enough reverse past cuts. If we account for expected increases in teacher pay, the real-terms increase in spending per pupil will be lower, at 6%. In any case, spending per pupil in 2022-23 is set to be no higher in real terms than in 2009-10.4 Secondary school spending per pupil in England (£6,000) was about 16% higher than in primary schools (£5,200) in 2019-20. This is down from a secondary/primary funding difference of 30% in 2010-11, partly reflecting large cuts to school sixth-form funding. It also continues a long-run trend, with the funding difference down from over 50% during the 1980s. Whilst empirical evidence shows high benefits to spending at younger ages, it is not clear evidence supports such a dramatic shift. 2020 annual report on education spending in England  The Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2020 9 5 The school funding system in England provides greater levels of spending to more deprived schools to help narrow the achievement gap between rich and poor. During the 2000s, the extra funding received by the most deprived schools compared with the least deprived ones grew from 20-25% in 2000-01 to 35% by 2010-11. 6 Despite the introduction of the Pupil Premium in 2011, the deprivation funding premium shrank back to 25% in 2018-...

We investigate differences in the returns to undergraduate degrees by socio-economic background and ethnicity using the Department for Education's Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO) data set. The LEO data set links school records, university records and tax records for everyone w ho took GCSEs in England since 2002. Using these data, we can estimate returns up to age 30. Our main findings are:• Average returns to undergraduate degrees at age 30 are positive for people from all socioeconomic and ethnic groups we study, but there is substantial heterogeneity across groups.Returns are especially high for privately-educated graduates, whose median earnings at age 30 are the highest of all groups. However, we find that the groups with the lowest graduate A1 Robustness: using IDACI instead of our SES measure 58 A2 Gender earnings gaps 59 A3 University subject choice by gender 62 A4 Age 30: unexplained gaps in earnings by SES and ethnicity 66 A5 Age 30 returns: graphs 68

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Institute for Fiscal Studies Key findingsHigher education is associated with greater geographical mobility.• At age 27, around 35% of graduates and 15% of non-graduates have moved away from the travel to work area (TTWA) where they lived at age 16.• Around two-fifths of the difference in mobility between graduates and non-graduates can be explained by differences in their background characteristics, such as socio-economic status, prior educational attainment and area of origin. All else equal, graduates are 10 percentage points more likely to have moved by age 27 than non-graduates.• Graduates of more selective universities are more mobile, even controlling for background characteristics and subject choice.Graduates move to places with better labour market opportunities.• Graduates tend to move to large cities, especially to London. Around a quarter of graduates who move go to London. In contrast, non-graduates do not disproportionately move to London and other large cities. Lindsey Macmillan. 2020. "The long shadow of deprivation: Differences in opportunities across England." Social Mobility Commission Research Report.

This report is the fourth in a series of annual reports on education spending in England. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Nuffield Foundation, which has funded this series of annual reports (grant number EDO/FR-000022637). The Nuffield Foundation is an independent charitable trust with a mission to advance social well-being. It funds research that informs social policy, primarily in Education, Welfare and Justice. It also funds student programmes that provide opportunities for young people to develop skills in quantitative and scientific methods. The Nuffield Foundation is the founder and co-funder of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Ada Lovelace Institute and the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory. The Foundation has funded this project, but the views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Foundation. Visit www.nuffieldfoundation.org.

Conclusion 67 Bibliography 70 A More on the HESA data 72 B Lifetime exchequer receipts 76 C Median net lifetime returns 81 D Full subject results by age 84 E Average net lifetime returns with different discount rates 85