The end of 1989 brought with it political and economic decisions which resulted in Kosovo being stripped of its autonomy and the Albanian population being expelled from their jobs. These facts combined with ethnic tensions created a decade of conflict and oppression affecting hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. Thousands of Kosovars moved overseas to seek work to support families at home, altering the way of life of the population of Kosovo irredeemably. The loss of income had serious repercussions on food security throughout the 1990s; possibilities of purchasing food were diminished, control on goods in 1998 reduced availability of foodstuffs, conflict affected accessibility to markets and shops and consequently food intake and nutritional status was compromised. The most vulnerable were those who had no family members overseas. Mass displacement of population due to ethnic cleansing during the war of spring 1999, further jeopardised food security status. Destruction at this time rendered large parts of Kosovo useless and resulted in a shift in the determinant of vulnerability in the post-war period: destruction of houses, land, livestock and agricultural products as well as loss of family members, became a far more pertinent indicator of food insecurity. The strong and clear links between conflict, socio-economic issues and food security are highlighted and discussed in this paper.

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Local authorities (LAs) across the country are among those on the front line of the coronavirus crisis. But geographical differences in demographic and economic structures make different parts of the country more vulnerable to different effects of the crisis-on health, on families and children, and on jobs and incomes. This means the demands and costs facing each LA will change in different ways and at different times. Moreover, differences in the extent to which each LA relies on different revenue sources, and in their financial reserves and commitments, mean they face differing degrees of financial risk and have differing degrees of financial resilience. This report is published alongside a spreadsheet dashboard that collates for each LA in England a series of indicators of coronavirus-related risks. It looks at the extent to which these risks vary and the degree to which they are correlated, focusing on LAs' revenues and financial resilience. It also briefly discusses the extra funding that central government has made available to them to help them address these risks in the current financial year. Key findings  The government has allocated £3.2 billion of general funding to LAs to help them cope better with the impact of the coronavirus crisis on their spending and income. Most of the first £1.6 billion of this was allocated on the basis of estimated needs for adult social care spending. But the second £1.6 billion has been allocated on a per-person basis, and 35% of funding from this tranche in areas with two-tier local government is going to lower-tier shire districts, up from less than 2% of the first tranche, with a reduction in the share going to upper-tier counties, which have responsibility for social care services.  The changes in how the second tranche of this funding has been allocated were motivated by returns from LAs suggesting the crisis is expected to impact income more than spending. Returns from a group of urban authorities mostly in the Midlands and North of England suggest impacts on income could exceed impacts on spending by two-thirds, with income from business rates and sales, fees and charges particularly affected.  Lower-tier shire district councils are particularly reliant on business rates revenues and income from sales, fees and charges, likely putting them at greater risk of revenue falls. On average, they could lose business rates revenues equivalent to 18% of revenue expenditure before a 'safety net system' compensates them for losses, compared with 6% for urban metropolitan districts and 2% for county councils. Fees for parking, cultural and leisure services, planning and trade waste schemes, which are likely at particular risk, are equivalent to an average of 29% of shire districts' budgets, compared with 7% for London boroughs and less than 1% for county councils.  There is substantial variation in reliance on these revenue sources between individual LAs, implying significant variation in risk to overall revenues. One in ten shire districts rely on fees from parking, cultu...

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business rates revenues this year having to be reflected in councils' main budgets from next year, and the potential for ongoing impacts to spending and income, especially if a COVID-19 vaccine is delayed. If the government wants to avoid cuts to services, additional funding will therefore be needed in the coming years.Additional support and/or financial flexibilitiesespecially if pressures are revised further upwardsmay also be needed for 2020-21 if the government wants to avoid some councils depleting a significant portion of their overall reserves or making in-year cuts to services. Key findings1 Councils forecast spending pressures of £4.4 billion and non-tax income pressures of £2.8 billion in 2020-21. Taken together, this equates to a financial hit equal to 13.0% of pre-crisis expenditure.Adult social care accounts for £1.8 billion of the spending pressures, with unspecified unachieved efficiency savings accounting for the next-biggest chunk, at £0.6 billion. Reductions in SFCs on transport account for £0.8 billion of the loss in income, with reductions in commercial income (such as from commercial rents and trading companies) forecast to be £0.6 billion.2 Approximately 41% of the spending pressures (£1.8 billion) and 45% of the income pressures (£1.3 billion) are estimated to have taken place between April and June (Q1). This implies that pressures are forecast to be less than half their Q1 levels in the remainder of the financial year. Of course, forecasting is subject to significant uncertainty, especially in the current environment, and pressures may abate by more or less than councils have assumed. If pressures in the remainder of the year turn out to be two-thirds of Q1 levels, for example, annual spending pressures and non-tax income pressures would each be around £1 billion higher than councils have forecast.