No abstract

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994-2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the ownermanager conflict in nonfamily firms.

No abstract

No abstract

I wish to thank my dissertation co-chairs, Richard Roll and Richard Rumelt, and the rest of my committee-Harold Demsetz, Guido Imbens, Matthias Kahl, Bill McKelvey, and William Ouchi-for their support and many helpful discussions. Thanks also to