Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported counterparts; the relevant empirical record, however, is mixed. To advance the debate, the authors conducted 4 experiments investigating how readily automatic preferences for one imagined social group over another could be induced or reversed. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that automatic preferences, like self-reported ones, could be readily induced by both abstract supposition and concrete learning. In contrast, Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that newly formed automatic preferences, unlike self-reported ones, could not be readily reversed by either abstract supposition or concrete learning. Thus, the relative inflexibility of implicit attitudes appears to entail, not immunity to sophisticated cognition, nor resistance to swift formation, but insensitivity to modification once formed.

a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f oCultured meat has evolved from an idea and concept into a reality with the August 2013 cultured hamburger tasting in London. Still, how consumers conceive cultured meat is largely an open question. This study addresses consumers' reactions and attitude formation towards cultured meat through analyzing focus group discussions and online deliberations with 179 meat consumers from Belgium, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Initial reactions when learning about cultured meat were underpinned by feelings of disgust and considerations of unnaturalness. Consumers saw few direct personal benefits but they were more open to perceiving global societal benefits relating to the environment and global food security. Both personal and societal risks were framed in terms of uncertainties about safety and health, and possible adverse societal consequences dealing with loss of farming and eating traditions and rural livelihoods. Further reflection pertained to skepticism about 'the inevitable' scientific progress, concern about risk governance and control, and need for regulation and proper labeling.

The authors hypothesized that activated self-stereotypes can influence the strategies of task solution by inducing regulatory foci. More specifically, positive self-stereotypes should induce a promotion focus state of eagerness, whereas negative stereotypes should induce a prevention focus state of vigilance. Study 1 showed that a negative ascribed stereotype with regard to task performance leads to better recall for avoidance-related statements whereas a positive stereotype leads to better recall for approach-related statements. In Studies 2 and 3, both an experimental manipulation of group performance expectation and the preexisting stereotype of better verbal skills in women than in men led to faster and less accurate performance in the positive as compared with the negative stereotype group. Studies 4 and 5 showed that positive in-group stereotypes led to more creative performance whereas negative stereotypes led to better analytical performance. These results point to a possible mechanism for stereotype-threat effects."Blonds are dumb"; " women can't do math"; "White men can't jump." If you bring members of a stereotyped group into an achievement situation where the stereotype could be applied, they often dramatically underperform if they believe their ability in that particular domain is measured. This was first shown by Steele and Aronson (1995) in their seminal work on the effect of stereotype activation on intellectual test performance of Blacks. In a series of studies, Blacks performed considerably poorer on a standardized test when it was presented as diagnostic of their abilities than when the same test was framed as a simple problem-solving task. No such difference emerged for Whites. This basic finding, named stereotype threat, has since been replicated several times with different groups and various stereotypes (e.g.,

The sudden devotion emotion: kama muta and the cultural practices whose function is to evoke it.