Over the past quarter century, labor's share of income in the United States has trended downwards, reaching its lowest level in the postwar period after the Great Recession. Detailed examination of the magnitude, determinants and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions. First, around one third of the decline in the published labor share is an artifact of a progressive understatement of the labor income of the self-employed underlying the headline measure. Second, movements in labor's share are not a feature solely of recent U.S. history: The relative stability of the aggregate labor share prior to the 1980s in fact veiled substantial, though offsetting, movements in labor shares within industries. By contrast, the recent decline has been dominated by trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital for (unskilled) labor to exploit technical change embodied in new capital goods. Fourth, institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization also receive weak support. Finally, we provide evidence that highlights the offshoring of the laborintensive component of the U.S. supply chain as a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years. the editors for their many suggestions and comments. We are grateful to Yifan Cao for his excellent research assistance.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe examine the diffusion of more than twenty technologies across twenty-three of the world's leading industrial economies. Our evidence covers major technology classes such as textile production, steel manufacture, communications, information technology, transportation, and electricity for the period 1788-2001. We document the common patterns observed in the diffusion of this broad range of technologies.Our results suggest a pattern of trickle-down diffusion that is remarkably robust across technologies. Most of the technologies that we consider originate in advanced economies and are adopted there first. Subsequently, they trickle down to countries that lag economically. Our panel data analysis indicates that the most important determinants of the speed at which a country adopts technologies are the country's human capital endowment, type of government, degree of openness to trade, and adoption of predecessor technologies. We also find that the overall rate of diffusion has increased markedly since World War II because of the convergence in these variables across countries.

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Most cross-country differences in per capita output are due to differences in total factor productivity (TFP), rather than to differences in the levels of factor inputs.1 These cross-country TFP disparities can be divided into two parts: those due to differences in the range of technologies used and those due to nontechnological factors that affect the efficiency with which all technologies and production factors are operated. In this paper, we explore the importance of the range of technologies used to explain cross-country differences in TFP.Existing studies of technology adoption are not well suited to answer this question. On the one hand, macroeconomic models of technology adoption (e.g., Stephen L. Parente and Edward C. Prescott 1994, and Susanto Basu and David N. Weil 1998) use an abstract concept of technology that is hard to match with data. On the other hand, the applied microeconomic technology diffusion literature (Zvi Griliches 1957; Edwin Mansfield 1961; Michael Gort and Steven Klepper 1982, among others) focuses on the estimation of diffusion curves for a relatively small number of technologies and countries. These diffusion curves, however, are purely statistical descriptions which are not embedded in an aggregate model. Hence, it is difficult to use them to explore the aggregate implications of the empirical findings. An Exploration of Technology Diffusion

a b s t r a c tConventional analyses of labor market fluctuations ascribe a minor role to labor force participation. We show, by contrast, that flows-based analyses imply that the participation margin accounts for around one-third of unemployment fluctuations. A novel stock-flow apparatus establishes these facts, delivering three further contributions. First, the role of the participation margin appears robust to adjustments for spurious transitions induced by reporting error. Second, conventional stocks-based analyses are subject to a stock-flow fallacy, neglecting offsetting forces of worker flows on the participation rate. Third, increases in labor force attachment among the unemployed during recessions are a leading explanation for the role of the participation margin.

Over the past quarter century, labor's share of income in the United States has trended downward, reaching its lowest level in the postwar period after the Great Recession. A detailed examination of the magnitude, determinants, and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions. First, about a third of the decline in the published labor share appears to be an artifact of statistical procedures used to impute the labor income of the self-employed that underlies the headline measure. Second, movements in labor's share are not solely a feature of recent U.S. history: The relative stability of the aggregate labor share prior to the 1980s in fact veiled substantial, though offsetting, movements in labor shares within industries. By contrast, the recent decline has been dominated by the trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital for (unskilled) labor to exploit technical change embodied in new capital goods. Fourth, prima facie evidence for institutional explanations based on the decline in unionization is inconclusive. Finally, our analysis identifies offshoring of the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply chain as a leading potential explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years. e ver since Kaldor (1957, 1961) documented his growth facts, the constancy of the share of income that flows to labor has been taken to be one of the quintessential stylized facts of macroeconomics. 1 After several

We provide a set of comparable estimates for the rates of inflow to and outflow from unemployment using publicly available data for fourteen OECD economies. Using a novel decomposition that allows for deviations of unemployment from its flow steady state, we find that fluctuations in both inflow and outflow rates contribute substantially to unemployment variation within countries. Anglo-Saxon economies exhibit approximately a 15:85 inflow-outflow split to unemployment variation, while continental European and Nordic countries display closer to a 45:55 split. In all economies, increases in inflows lead increases in unemployment, whereas outflows lag a ramp-up in unemployment.

Since 1968, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP has varied by a factor of 5. In 1972, the ratio stood at above unity, but by 1974, it had fallen to 0.45 where it stayed for the next decade.It then began a steady climb, and today it stands above 2. We argue that the IT revolution was behind this and, moreover, that the capitalization/GDP ratio is likely to decline and then rise after any major technological shift. The three assumptions that deliver the result are: