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Objective To assess the prevalence of disordered eating behaviors (DEBs) in a large sample of Italian adolescents with type 1 diabetes and to explore potential demographic, clinical, and psychological differences (understood as emotional and behavioral problems) among adolescents with and without DEBs. Method Adolescents (11–19 years) with type 1 diabetes completed the Diabetes Eating Problems Survey‐revised (DEPS‐r) and the Youth Self Report (YSR). Demographic and clinical data were also collected. Results Of 690 adolescents with type 1 diabetes (mean age 14.97 ± 1.81, n = 337 girls) assessed in this study, 28.1% (21% boys, 35% girls) were DEPS‐r positive (score ≥ 20). Girls had higher DEPS‐r total scores (p < .0001, d = .42) than boys, although no age differences were found in mean DEPS‐r total scores (p = .961). In both genders, adolescents with DEBs had significantly higher zBMI (p < .0001, d = .52) and HbA1c values (p < .0001, d = .54) and showed more emotional and behavioral problems (both as internalizing and externalizing problems) than those without DEBs (all p < .0001). These differences were largely confirmed in all age groups. Adolescents reporting insulin misuse had higher HbA1c values (p = .001, d = .26), higher DEPS‐r mean scores (p < .0001, d = 1.07), and greater psychological problems (all p < .001) than those who did not. Discussion DEBs are prevalent among adolescents with type 1 diabetes, and those with eating problems showed adverse clinical and psychological conditions. Routine screening for DEBs and of general psychological condition should be a fundamental part of diabetes care, especially during adolescence. Public significance statement This nationwide study indicated that DEBs are common in adolescents with T1D, and those suffering from them show poorer clinical conditions and higher emotional and behavioral problems. As such, it offers important contributions for those working with EDs and in the T1D field, as it provides a deeper understanding of the co‐occurring DEBs–emotional/behavioral problems in youths with T1D and highlights the importance of continuous monitoring of their psychological condition by a multidisciplinary team.

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Background and aims Although numerous correlational studies have shown an association between cognitive distortions and problem gambling, only a few behavioral studies have investigated this topic by comparing problem (PGs) and non-problem gamblers (N-PGs). This quasi-experiment investigated the occurrence in both groups of a widespread cognitive distortion, the gambler’s fallacy (GF), using a fictitious roulette game. Moreover, it investigated whether the GF increased the bet amount and whether impulsivity and sensation seeking were associated with the GF. Methods Two indices of the GF were used: a cognitive index, the probability estimate of each outcome (black/red) after manipulating the final run length (the same outcome occurring four times/once), and a behavioral index, the choice of the outcome on which to bet. A total of 320 (160 PGs and 160 N-PGs) unpaid male volunteers, aged between 18 and 68, participated in this study. Hypotheses Erroneous probability estimates should mediate the effect of longer runs on the alternation choice (i.e., the choice of an outcome different from the previous one) to support the occurrence of GF. The GF should increase betting. PGs should be more prone than N-PGs to GF. Results The choice of the outcome depended on both cognitive (erroneous probability estimates) and affective (preference for red) factors. PGs bet more than N-PGs but they were not more prone than N-PGs to incurring GF. Although impulsivity and sensation seeking were more intense in PGs than in N-PGs, they scarcely affected GF. Discussion and conclusions Overall, our results corroborate the tested model of the GF that links mistaken probability estimates, choice of the outcome on which to bet, and bet amount. However, they are similar to PGs and N-PGs and fail to corroborate the hypothesis that the GF is more evident in PGs.

Objectives: The mainstream position on regret in psychological literature is that its necessary conditions are agency and responsibility, that is, to choose freely but badly. Without free choice, other emotions, such as disappointment, are deemed to be elicited when the outcome is worse than expected. In two experiments, we tested the opposite hypothesis that being forced by external circumstances to choose an option inconsistent with one’s own intentions is an important source of regret and a core component of its phenomenology, regardless of the positivity/negativity of the post-decision outcome. Along with regret, four post-decision emotions – anger toward oneself, disappointment, anger toward circumstances, and satisfaction – were investigated to examine their analogies and differences to regret with regard to antecedents, appraisals, and phenomenological aspects.Methods: Through the scenario methodology, we manipulated three variables: choice (free/forced), outcome (positive/negative), and time (short/long time after decision-making). Moreover, we investigated whether responsibility, decision justifiability, and some phenomenological aspects (self-attribution, other attribution, and contentment) mediated the effect exerted by choice, singularly or in interaction with outcome and time, on the five emotions. Each study was conducted with 336 participants, aged 18–60.Results: The results of both studies were similar and supported our hypothesis. In particular, regret elicited by forced choice was always high, regardless of the valence of outcome, whereas free choice elicited regret was high only with a negative outcome. Moreover, regret was unaffected by responsibility and decision justifiability, whereas it was affected by the three phenomenological dimensions.Conclusion: Our results suggest that (1) the prevailing theory of regret is too binding, since it posits as necessary some requirements which are not; (2) the antecedents and phenomenology of regret are broader than it is generally believed; (3) decision-making produces a complex emotional constellation, where the different emotions, singularly and/or in combination, constitute the affective responses to the different aspects of decision-making.