Reliable and valid metamemory measures are needed to assess subjective memory complaints that can be distinct from objective memory performance. The Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ) evaluates dimensions of subjective memory functioning such as frequency of memory problems (Ability), affect related to memory abilities (Contentment), and strategy use in everyday life (Strategy). To examine the psychometric properties of the Italian version of the MMQ, six hundred Italian healthy individuals (aged 25-91 years) completed MMQ, a questionnaire assessing metacognition (Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, CFQ) and two batteries assessing cognitive global status (Montreal Cognitive Assessment, MoCA; Mini Mental State Examination, MMSE). MMQ was easy to administer, acceptable, and had good test-retest reliability (r for the total MMQ score 0.95), and internal consistency (Cronbach's α for the total MMQ score = 0.83). An exploratory factor analysis provided a four-factor solution: "Ability" (α = 0.99), "Contentment" (α = 0.91), "External Strategies" (α = 0.85) and "Internal Strategies" (α = 0.78) factors. MMQ total score and MMQ-Ability factor score showed good convergent validity when compared to CFQ score (r rho ≥ 0.51), whereas MMQ total score and the four MMQ factors showed good divergent validity when compared to MoCA and MMSE score (r rho ≤ 0.27). Demographic variables significantly influenced MMQ total score and most subscale scores. From the derived linear equations, we computed correction factors for raw scores and percentile distribution of adjusted scores. The Italian version of MMQ is reliable and valid to assess dimensions of metamemory in adult and elderly subjects.

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Objectives: The mainstream position on regret in psychological literature is that its necessary conditions are agency and responsibility, that is, to choose freely but badly. Without free choice, other emotions, such as disappointment, are deemed to be elicited when the outcome is worse than expected. In two experiments, we tested the opposite hypothesis that being forced by external circumstances to choose an option inconsistent with one’s own intentions is an important source of regret and a core component of its phenomenology, regardless of the positivity/negativity of the post-decision outcome. Along with regret, four post-decision emotions – anger toward oneself, disappointment, anger toward circumstances, and satisfaction – were investigated to examine their analogies and differences to regret with regard to antecedents, appraisals, and phenomenological aspects.Methods: Through the scenario methodology, we manipulated three variables: choice (free/forced), outcome (positive/negative), and time (short/long time after decision-making). Moreover, we investigated whether responsibility, decision justifiability, and some phenomenological aspects (self-attribution, other attribution, and contentment) mediated the effect exerted by choice, singularly or in interaction with outcome and time, on the five emotions. Each study was conducted with 336 participants, aged 18–60.Results: The results of both studies were similar and supported our hypothesis. In particular, regret elicited by forced choice was always high, regardless of the valence of outcome, whereas free choice elicited regret was high only with a negative outcome. Moreover, regret was unaffected by responsibility and decision justifiability, whereas it was affected by the three phenomenological dimensions.Conclusion: Our results suggest that (1) the prevailing theory of regret is too binding, since it posits as necessary some requirements which are not; (2) the antecedents and phenomenology of regret are broader than it is generally believed; (3) decision-making produces a complex emotional constellation, where the different emotions, singularly and/or in combination, constitute the affective responses to the different aspects of decision-making.

Abstract. Nowadays, companies who want to engage environment-friendly consumers increasingly rely on green-economy oriented campaigns.

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