No abstract

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2116 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017961262ISBN: 978-0-8330-9886-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark.iii PrefaceIn recent years the Air Force has faced persistent resource constraints while trying to deliver necessary training to its new officer and enlisted forces. While the cost of training is a key constraint, other resources such as instructors, training devices, and facilities are also in limited supply. Planning processes attempt to achieve training goals with the fewest resources possible, but alterations in training requirements, mismatches in the supply of students and available classroom space, and uncertainties in the flow of students through the training pipeline can tax resources and contribute to the Air Force falling short of targets for trained personnel. While achieving this balance is never simple, in years of plentiful manpower and financial resources the inefficiencies that can stymie this process are less perceptible. After several years of end strength and budget reductions, the Air Force is currently adapting to increases in end strength by accessing additional personnel who must receive initial skills training. However, these increases are putting a strain on the resources required to conduct technical training and highlighting inefficiencies that at other times might have gone unnoticed.Realizing these challenges, Air Force leadership at Air Education and Training Command (AETC) asked RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) to identify ways to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the Air Force's nonrated technical training processes, both officer and enlisted, to meet changing force and support requirements. The Air Force asked PAF to identify opportunities for optimizing overall processes at all levels of technical training-corporate Air Force planning and programming, AETC strategic training management, training management at 2...

No abstract

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.