This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted plate or coin, are part of perceptual experience. If they are part of perceptual experience, then it should be possible to identify these shapes simply by attending appropriately to them. Otherwise, in order to identify perspectival shapes they must first be constructed in the visual imagination. We propose that these accounts of perspectival identification can be tested by measuring the interference between visual and verbal working memory load, respectively, and the identification of perspectival shapes in the appearance of a 3D object. * Both authors contributed equally to this work. 1 We use "perspectival shape" instead of "apparent shape" since there is a clear sense in which the object shape is also apparent: e.g. the white face of the cube in Figure 1 clearly looks square, and the billiards rack looks like an equilateral triangle, etc. 2 The properties of distance and slant (in 3D) are viewer-relative but do not count as perspectival properties for our purposes. That is because we consider them instead to be part of our experience of the 3D world around us. For example, the rim of a cup, when viewed obliquely, looks circular, slanted in depth, and located some distance away. What we call "perspectival properties" are (roughly) those that a painter would draw on a 2D canvas, i.e., those that 3D objects project onto a flat medium, perpendicular to the line of sight. These do not include 3D slant and distance.

According to an influential philosophical view I call "the relational properties view" (RPV), "perspectival" properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of

Forthcoming in Philosophical PsychologyA commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has 'assertoric' or 'phenomenal' force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings-as opposed to beliefs (and other cognitive states)-penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences non-assertoric.