Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective

Weksler, Assaf

doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0239-2

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similar views are attributed to Attneave, who had a "sandbox in the head" theory of both perception and imagery: "These 'sandbox in the head' theories (Attneave, 1972) propose that depth is encoded directly in perceiving and imagining, and that no special status is afforded to the picture plane or any other two-dimensional surface" (Kerr, 1993). An oft-quoted passage from Palmer (1999) states that, under conditions of perceptual constancy, "people veridically perceive the constant, unchanging properties of external objects rather than the more transient properties of their retinal images" (emphasis added by Weksler, 2016; see also Schulte, 2021); another passage asserts that, when there is sufficient depth information, "shapes at a slant look the same as they do in the frontal plane" (though it must be noted that other passages seem to embrace certain aspects of perspectival appearance). More recently, Erdogan and Jacobs (2017), writing here in Psychological Review, present a model (also referenced by Burge and Burge) that seems aligned with such views in both the content and format of the representations involved, holding that "shape representations code information about an object's three-dimensional structure, not the two-dimensional structure of its retinal image" and that "shape representations code shape properties in an object-centered coordinate system, not a viewer-centered coordinate system".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity

Morales¹,

Firestone²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021a) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image”. We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity

Morales¹,

Firestone²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For their part, Burge and Burge bring a similar charge against our discussion, asserting that "Morales et al barely discuss philosophy that utilizes science's treatment of perspective in perception" and offering instead the following five publications:Burge (2010);Burge (2014a);Burge (2014b);Lande (2018);and Rescorla (2014). In fact, our article discussed or referenced nearly two dozen works of philosophy, among them the following publications that are substantively engaged with the science of perception (in general) and visual perspective (in particular):Bennett (2012);Bennett (2016);Briscoe (2008);Cohen (2010);Green and Schellenberg (2018);Hill and Bennett (2008);Noë (2004);Weksler (2016);and Wojtach (2009). Burge and Burge's charge may be related to their surprising dismissal of work by several leading philosophers of perception cited in our paper.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beyond the sources cited in our original article, antiperspectivalist views are often attributed to Attneave, who had a “sandbox in the head” theory of both perception and imagery: “These ‘sandbox in the head’ theories (Attneave, 1972) propose that depth is encoded directly in perceiving and imagining, and that no special status is afforded to the picture plane or any other two-dimensional surface” (Kerr, 1993). An oft-quoted passage from Palmer (1999) states that, under conditions of perceptual constancy, “people veridically perceive the constant, unchanging properties of external objects rather than the more transient properties of their retinal images” (emphasis added by Weksler, 2016; see also Schulte, 2021); another passage asserts that, when there is sufficient depth information, “shapes at a slant look the same as they do in the frontal plane” (though other passages seem to embrace certain aspects of perspectival appearance). More recently, Erdogan and Jacobs (2017), writing in Psychological Review , present a model (also referenced by Burge and Burge) that seems aligned with such views in both the content and format of the representations involved, holding that “shape representations code information about an object’s three-dimensional structure, not the two-dimensional structure of its retinal image” and that “shape representations code shape properties in an object-centered coordinate system, not a viewer-centered coordinate system.” This is not to say that such theories could not accommodate perspectival similarity or account for empirical evidence in its favor (nor that there aren’t other, contrasting scientific accounts), but rather that perspectival similarity is neither assumed nor actively predicted by these models.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity.

Morales¹,

Firestone²

2024

Psychological Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest.

show abstract

“…For earlier examples of this strategy, applied to debates about the content of perspectival experience and the thesis of attentional transparency, seeWeksler (2016) and (2017), respectively.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach

Schwenkler

Weksler

2018

Phenom Cogn Sci

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted plate or coin, are part of perceptual experience. If they are part of perceptual experience, then it should be possible to identify these shapes simply by attending appropriately to them. Otherwise, in order to identify perspectival shapes they must first be constructed in the visual imagination. We propose that these accounts of perspectival identification can be tested by measuring the interference between visual and verbal working memory load, respectively, and the identification of perspectival shapes in the appearance of a 3D object. * Both authors contributed equally to this work. 1 We use "perspectival shape" instead of "apparent shape" since there is a clear sense in which the object shape is also apparent: e.g. the white face of the cube in Figure 1 clearly looks square, and the billiards rack looks like an equilateral triangle, etc. 2 The properties of distance and slant (in 3D) are viewer-relative but do not count as perspectival properties for our purposes. That is because we consider them instead to be part of our experience of the 3D world around us. For example, the rim of a cup, when viewed obliquely, looks circular, slanted in depth, and located some distance away. What we call "perspectival properties" are (roughly) those that a painter would draw on a 2D canvas, i.e., those that 3D objects project onto a flat medium, perpendicular to the line of sight. These do not include 3D slant and distance.

show abstract

Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective

Abstract: According to an influential philosophical view I call "the relational properties view" (RPV), "perspectival" properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of

Cited by 5 publications

References 27 publications

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity

Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity.

Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About