Humans use punishment to influence each other's behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Experiment 1). Under some situations, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Experiment 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Experiment 3). And people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Experiment 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to be constructed and interpreted as a communicative act.

Punishment is traditionally modeled as a “constructed incentive”. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behavior. This model spans moral psychology, behavioral economics, artificial intelligence and comparative psychology. Yet, while it captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the constructed incentive model, a person learns from punishment the way she learns from other negative events: by trying to avoid the state or action that elicited it. In contrast, according to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that are maximally informative given the learner’s likely inferential stance. This coordinated communicative reasoning enables faster and more accurate learning during punishment and provides a better fit to empirical data on how people actually punish and learn from punishment.

Punishment is traditionally modelled as a ‘constructed incentive’. Specifically, the person who punishes is constructing a set of incentives that will motivate the person being punished to change her behaviour. Yet, while this model captures something important about the logic of punishment, it also misses important contours of how humans punish and how they learn from punishment. We argue that, in addition to understanding punishment as a form of incentive, we must also understand it as a form of communication. According to the communication model, a person can learn from punishment by attempting to infer the punisher’s communicative intent. Meanwhile, the punisher can choose punishments that are maximally informative given the learner’s likely inferential stance. This coordinated communicative reasoning enables faster and more accurate learning during punishment and provides a better fit to empirical data on how people actually punish and learn from punishment.

Knowledge of intention and outcome is integral to making judgments of responsibility, blame, and causality. Yet, little is known about the effect of conflicting intentions and outcomes on these judgments. In a series of four experiments, we combine good and bad intentions with positive and negative outcomes, presenting these through everyday moral scenarios. Our results demonstrate an asymmetry in responsibility, causality, and blame judgments for the two incongruent conditions: well-intentioned agents are regarded more morally and causally responsible for negative outcomes than ill-intentioned agents are held for positive outcomes. This novel effect of an intention-outcome asymmetry identifies an unexplored aspect of moral judgment and is partially explained by extra inferences that participants make about the actions of the moral agent.

Why do we punish negligence? Leading accounts explain away the punishment of negligence as a consequence of other, well-known phenomena: outcome bias, character inference, or the volitional choice not to exercise due care. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something both fundamental and unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they don’t arise from conscious, volitional choice. Then, drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for forgetting will help them remember in the future. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions.