When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may try to influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. Confirming anecdotal evidence on retailer marketing tricks, we show that competitive retailers exploit context-sensitivity by designing environments that drive a wedge between preferences before and after entering a store. This wedge induces naïve consumers to switch preference from a loss-leader product that attracts consumers into the store to a more profitable product. Depending on the quality preferences and budget of consumers, markets are either in an "up-selling" or "down-selling" equilibrium. In the former, firms attract consumers with low-quality products, compete on prices, and design context to ultimately sell a product of higher price. In the latter, firms attract consumers with high-price products, compete on quality, and design context to ultimately sell a product of lower quality. When modeling context-sensitivity according to the theories of Salience, Focusing, or Relative Thinking, designing context comes down to the introduction of a single decoy product. This decoy draws consumer attention at the store to the favorable attributes of the product the firm aims to sell.

When preferences are sensitive to context, firms may influence purchase decisions by designing the environment of consumption choices. This paper studies how competitive retailers optimally design their product line if preferences at the store depend on whether the choice set draws consumer attention to the quality or price of a product. Before making a purchase decision, a consumer chooses among retailers without (fully) anticipating that her preferences at the store are malleable. We show that this setup can align evidence on retailer marketing practices and the existence of loss leaders with the experimental literature on decoy effects: in equilibrium, retailers use loss leaders to attract the consumer to the store and decoy products to draw consumer attention at the store to more profitable alternatives featuring a higher price (inducing a profitable upsell) or lower production cost (inducing a profitable downsell). We embed and compare the predictions of three recent specifications of choice-set dependent attention—namely, Salience, Focusing, and Relative Thinking. All three specifications predict that firms construct choice environments that utilize decoy effects to up- or downsell the consumer. Because they differ in how attention can be directed using the product line, however, they differ in their predictions of how the decoy will be positioned in the price-quality space. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

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