Abstraet. In the eontext of eoalition formation games a player eyaluates a partition on the basis of the set she belongs to, For this eyaluation to be possible, players are supposed to haye preferenees Oyer sets to whieh they eould belong. In this paper, we suggest two extensions of .preferenees oyer indiyiduals to preferenees oyer sets, For the first one, deriyed from the most preferred member of a set, it is shown that a striet eore partition always exists if the original preferenees are striet and a simple algorithm for the eomputation of one striet eore partition is deriyed. This algorithm tums out to be strategy proof. Th'e seeond extension, based on the least preferred member of a set, produces solutions yery similar to those for the stable roommates problem.
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78.
Abstract. I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of "non-reverse" preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.
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