Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems

Alcalde, Jose; Romero‐Medina, Antonio

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0743

Cited by 55 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In this context, [4] analyze Nash equilibria and showed that they coincide with the equilibria of a centralized market. 19 Other papers related to decentralized matching markets are by Peleg [9], Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and RomeroMedina [2], and Alcalde and Romero-Medina [3]. Their models differs from ours, however, in an important respect.…”

Section: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 81%

Decentralised Job Matching

Haeringer

Wooders

2003

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in Decentralised Job Matching SummaryThis paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents' actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the workeroptimal matching.

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Section: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 81%

Decentralised Job Matching

Haeringer

Wooders

2003

SSRN Journal

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“…On the other hand, one can also think of a mechanism in which the buyers choose simultaneously their preferred objects once the sellers have simultaneously proposed prices. This is in the spirit of the mechanisms analyzed in Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998) and Alcalde and Romero-Medina (1999). However, in contrast with the previous papers, the implementation of the mechanism in the assignment games brings about the problem of deciding what happens if two different buyers choose the same object.…”

Section: -Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina (1998), and Alcalde and Romero-Medina (1999) implement through simple mechanisms the set of stable matchings in the college-admissions problem and in the job matching market, respectively. Moreover, they also implement particular subsets of the stable correspondence.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

Pérez‐Castrillo

Sotomayor

2002

Journal of Economic Theory

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Abstract:For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies. That is, the mechanism leads to the maximum equilibrium prices and to an optimal matching.

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“…The study of sequential matching mechanism under perfect and complete information is not new in the literature even with few examples as Alcalde et al (1998), Alcalde andRomero-Medina (2000) and(2005). Our model apparently shares features of the sequential mechanism described by Alcalde and RomeroMedina (2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ramon y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

Romero-Medina,

Triossi

2006

SSRN Journal

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Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems

Cited by 55 publications

References 10 publications

Decentralised Job Matching

Decentralised Job Matching

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

Ramon y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

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