This paper offers a theoretical explanation for why interfirm collaborations form yet fail, and further suggests how firms might manage them for a more positive outcome. Based on a perspective of value, we explain how a more inclusive and integrative perspective, one which combines elements from transaction costs and resource-based theory, provides more robust insight into collaboration formation, management, and instability. In doing so, we differentiate rent-yielding firm-specific assets at the core of the resource-based view from the transaction-specific assets at the core of transaction cost theory. The paper makes a crucial distinction between the potential value attainable through collaborations and its actual realization. The crux of our argument is that firms enter into collaborative relationships because these are expected to yield superior value relative to alternate organizational forms in certain situations, offering potentially synergistic combinations of complementary resources and capabilities, yet such relationships are frequently prone to failure because the partner firms tend not to recognize ex ante the nature and extent of transaction-specific investment that is required in the collaborative relationship to attain these synergies. In our argument, critically, the relationship between organizations is seen not simply as a governance structure of a hybrid nature but, more importantly, as a productive resource for value creation and realization. In this light, transaction-specific investment in what we term relational specificity becomes imperative. In the search for value, we explain why the transaction costs incurred in the exchange of resources are not independent of the nature of resources to be transacted and, similarly, why the returns realized from these resources are not independent of the relationship- and transaction-specific expenditures incurred in effectively combining them and maintaining the combination. The interdependence between the two, mediated by the quality of the relationship, has direct implications for the earning of rents through collaborations. These relationship-specific expenditures can be of an internally generated nature, endogenous to the alliance form itself, and need not exceed alternative forms, while the associated benefits have the capacity to potentially exceed the alternatives. This translates into potentially superior value. The paper contributes in three key related ways: (a) the explicit recognition of the relationship as a value-bearing asset embedded in a larger and endogenous institutional context, namely a system of resource relationships—both intraorganizational and inter-organizational—among partner firms and the collaboration, (b) the recognition of the evolving relationship between production and exchange which, at the level of the collaboration, is directly dependent on the nature, evolution, and dynamics of the relationship among the parties to the transaction, and (c) the provision of a nontrust explanation for why firms might knowingly forego opportunities to take advantage of their partners. Drawing from this, the paper occasions (a) a shift in focus from the form to the process of governance, which has direct implications for value creation and realization and (b) a shift in the primary identity of transaction-specific and relationship-specific expenditures from cost to investment in future value.
This paper compares and contrasts the mode of foreign market entry decision from the transaction cost/internalization and organizational capability perspectives. Each of these perspectives operates at a different level of analysis, respectively the transaction and the firm, and consequently differs in the primary arena of attention, namely transaction characteristics and the capabilities of firms. In making the comparison, a key distinction is made between the cost and the value aspects in the management of know-how, based on which issues pertaining to the transfer of knowledge within and across firm boundaries and the exploitation and enhancement of competitive advantage are closely examined. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the implications of a shift in frame from cost to value in the analysis of decisions related to firm boundaries. Entry into foreign markets is used primarily as a vehicle for the accomplishment of this purpose. The paper shows how the value-based framework of the organizational capability perspective radically and fundamentally shifts the approach towards the governance of firm boundaries and argues that, even though TC/internalization theory raises some valid concerns, the organizational capability framework may be more in tune with today's business context. Some of the assumptions of the TC/internalization perspective, both direct--opportunism, exploitation of existing advantage-and indirect-preservation of the value of know-how across locational contexts, asymmetry between bounded rationality for transaction and production purposes-are critically examined and questioned. Implications of a shift from a cost to a value-based framework are discussed and the need for a shift in research focus is emphasized.
We investigate the rapid internationalization of many multinationals from emerging economies through acquisition in advanced economies. We conceptualize these acquisitions as an act and form of entrepreneurship, aimed to overcome the 'liability of emergingness' incurred by these firms and to serve as a mechanism for competitive catch-up through opportunity seeking and capability transformation. Our explanation emphasizes (1) the unique asymmetries (and not necessarily advantages) distinguishing emerging multinationals from advanced economy multinationals due to their historical and institutional differences, as well as (2) a search for advantage creation when firms possess mainly ordinary resources. The argument shifts the central focus from advantage to asymmetries as the starting point for internationalization and, additionally, highlights the role of learning agility rather than ability as a potential 'asset of emergingness.
In this paper, three points are argued. The first is that Ronald Coase, best known as the forefather of transaction cost theory, foresaw many of the critical questions that proponents of the resource‐based view are concerned with today. The second is that resource‐based theory plays a potentially much more critical role in economic theory and in explaining the institutional structure of production than even many resource‐based scholars recognize. The last point is that a more complete understanding of the organization of economic activity requires a greater sensitivity to the interdependence of production and exchange relations. The arguments presented in this paper highlight important, but relatively ignored, elements in Coase's work that inform strategy research. More importantly, this paper makes the case for a triangular alignment between the triumvirate of governance structure, transaction, and resource attributes and demonstrates how the identity and strategy of a particular firm influences how its resources interact with the transaction and how the firm chooses to govern it. The general argument is then applied to the context of interfirm collaborative relations, where the key focus is broadened from just cost to also include skills/knowledge and the interdependence between cost and skills with respect to firm boundaries, both in terms of choice and nature. Such a broadening of focus enables us to additionally examine the transacting process as a productive endeavor, which underpins the co‐evolution of the competencies of partner firms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This paper develops a multidimensional, process-based conceptualization of alliance portfolio management capability. Arguing that such a capability consists of organizational processes to proactively pursue alliance formation opportunities, engage in relational governance, and coordinate knowledge and strategies across the portfolio, we examine the impact of such a capability on organizational outcomes in the context of formal structure (alliance function) and strategy (portfolio diversity). Using data from 235 firms, we find that these three processes have a positive effect on a firm's alliance portfolio capital, and some of these effects are conditioned by a formal alliance function and diversity of the portfolio. Whereas the ability of proactive formation and relational governance processes to create value is further strengthened in the presence of an alliance function, that of the coordination dimension is weakened. Furthermore, the benefits of relational governance are strengthened for firms with diverse portfolios, whereas the benefits of coordination processes are weakened. We discuss implications of these findings for the alliance and network literature, and in general, for firm heterogeneity. In summary, we find evidence that variance in process-based capabilities to manage alliance portfolios can explain performance heterogeneity among firms.
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