While Vietnam's reforms provided some of the weakest legal private property rights amongst the transition countries, cities like Ho Chi Minh City have booming domestic real estate markets. Interestingly, while most properties in 2001 did not have legal title, those on the market did advertise a variety of property rights claims. Employing a hedonic price model to analyse the pattern of prices at which sellers offer properties in Ho Chi Minh City, this study examines how this market values property rights. The findings show that multiple forms of property rights, enforced by highly decentralized state institutions, are operational in this market. Furthermore, legal title itself is not the most valuable form of property right. These findings suggest that the value of property rights emanates from where it is enforced within the particular institutional context of a market. JEL classifications: B52, D23, K11, P20, R31.

As in other rapidly growing economies, Vietnam’s urban land development has been a source of social conflict as those who are relocated contest the distribution of economic gains. More recently, the relocated have increased their bargaining power and receive better compensation packages. The paper analyses this situation to discuss further developing our understanding of how property rights institutions change. The case study shows the efficacy of social narratives to renegotiate the terms of the social contract supporting property rights even in a society with limited means for public participation in governmental reform. Secondly, it illuminates that modern property rights are entwined with public finance and so property rights reforms are tied to the organisational structure of government and fiscal relations.

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