Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 has caused a pandemic in humans. Farmed mink ( Neovison vison ) are also susceptible. In Denmark, this virus has spread rapidly among farmed mink, resulting in some respiratory disease. Full-length virus genome sequencing revealed novel virus variants in mink. These variants subsequently appeared within the local human community.

In 2000, farmed mink kits in Denmark were affected by a neurological disorder. The characteristic clinical signs included shaking, staggering gait, and ataxia. The disease, given the name shaking mink syndrome, was reproduced by the inoculation of brain homogenate from affected mink kits into healthy ones. However, the etiology remained unknown despite intensive efforts. In this study, random amplification and large-scale sequencing were used, and an astrovirus was detected in the brain tissue of three experimentally infected mink kits. This virus also was found in the brain of three mink kits naturally displaying the disease but not in the six healthy animals investigated. The complete coding region of the detected astrovirus was sequenced and compared to those of both a mink astrovirus associated with preweaning diarrhea and to a recently discovered human astrovirus associated with a case of encephalitis in a boy with x-linked agammaglobulinemia. The identities were 80.4 and 52.3%, respectively, showing that the virus described in this study was more similar to the preweaning diarrhea mink astrovirus. For the nonstructural coding regions the sequence identity was around 90% compared to that of the astrovirus, which is associated with preweaning diarrhea in mink. The region coding for the structural protein was more diverse, showing only 67% sequence identity. This finding is of interest not only because the detected virus may be the etiological agent of the shaking mink syndrome but also because this is one of the first descriptions of an astrovirus found in the central nervous system of animals.

SARS-CoV-2 infection is the cause of COVID-19 in humans. In April 2020, SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed mink (Neovision vision) occurred in the Netherlands. The first outbreaks in Denmark were detected in June 2020 in three farms. A steep increase in the number of infected farms occurred from September and onwards. Here, we describe prevalence data collected from 215 infected mink farms to characterize spread and impact of disease in infected farms. In one third of the farms, no clinical signs were observed. In farms with clinical signs, decreased feed intake, increased mortality and respiratory symptoms were most frequently observed, during a limited time period (median of 11 days). In 65% and 69% of farms, virus and sero-conversion, respectively, were detected in 100% of sampled animals at the first sampling. SARS-CoV-2 was detected, at low levels, in air samples collected close to the mink, on mink fur, on flies, on the foot of a seagull, and in gutter water, but not in feed. Some dogs and cats from infected farms tested positive for the virus. Chickens, rabbits, and horses sampled on a few farms, and wildlife sampled in the vicinity of the infected farms did not test positive for SARS-CoV-2. Thus, mink are highly susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2, but routes of transmission between farms, other than by direct human contact, are unclear.

In June–November 2020, SARS-CoV-2-infected mink were detected in 290 of 1,147 Danish mink farms. In North Denmark Region, 30% (324/1,092) of people found connected to mink farms tested SARS-CoV-2-PCR-positive and approximately 27% (95% confidence interval (CI): 25–30) of SARS-CoV-2-strains from humans in the community were mink-associated. Measures proved insufficient to mitigate spread. On 4 November, the government ordered culling of all Danish mink. Farmed mink constitute a potential virus reservoir challenging pandemic control.

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The distribution on serovars of 60 Salmonella isolates from reptiles kept in captivity in Denmark during the period 1995-2006 was investigated. The isolates were all recovered from clinical specimens submitted to the National Veterinary Institute. A majority of the samples were from reptiles in zoological gardens or similar, while a minor number was from reptiles kept in private homes. A total of 43 serovars were detected, most of them being what is usually called exotic serotypes, and many not having a trivial name, while a few isolates belonged to well-known human pathogenic serovars, such as S. Enteritidis, S. Typhimurium, S. Bovismorbificans. One isolate was rough and two were non-typeable. Isolates from turtles belonged to the subspecies enterica, while many isolates from both sauria and snakes belonged to other subspecies. The findings underline the potential zoonotic risk by handling reptiles in zoological garden or other public settings, or keeping pet reptiles in private homes.

The first case of HP H5N1 infection of wild and domestic birds in Denmark was experienced in March 2006. This is the first full genome characterisation of HP H5N1 avian influenza A virus in the Nordic countries. The Danish viruses from this time period have their origin from the wild bird strains from Qinghai in 2005. These viruses may have been introduced to the Northern Europe through unusual migration due to the cold weather in Eastern Europe at that time.

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