It is widely acknowledged that the implementation of international human rights judgments is conditioned by domestic factors; yet the means by which judgments exert—or fail to exert—influence on domestic actors and processes is less well understood. This article presents qualitative research undertaken in three European states between 2016 and 2018 to trace the path between selected judgments involving structural or systemic violations and subsequent action by both state and non-state actors. The rich account of the implementation process thereby constructed reveals, in some cases, a direct—and even immediate—causal path between a decision and actions leading to compliance and, in others, a more indirect or uncertain relationship. The article reveals the dynamic and iterative nature of the implementation process, which may at times stall and at other times accelerate and which may be punctuated by extraneous developments that cause the political space for implementation to widen or narrow. It proceeds to examine the strategies employed by actors who either advance or obstruct implementation, and concludes by advocating the formation of the broadest possible compliance ‘partnerships’ in each case, supported by well-functioning domestic structures to coordinate the state’s response.
AbstractAssessing the extent to which states have implemented the decisions of supranational human rights bodies is a challenging task. It requires supranational bodies—be they judicial, quasi-judicial or political—to create an evidence-based public record of the status quo of implementation at any point in time and determine whether the measures taken do, in fact, satisfy the requirements of the decision. This, in turn, relies upon states engaging in good faith, victims having a voice, and civil society organizations seizing the opportunity to influence the follow-up process. Using empirical data from interviews in selected states in the African, Inter-American and European regions, and within regional and United Nations bodies, this article argues that in no human rights ‘system’ are all these expectations met, in part because follow-up work is inadequately resourced. It argues that supranational bodies should proactively seek out diverse sources of information and adopt more transparent and responsive working methods so as to enable ‘real time’ participation by all interested parties. The article concludes with recommendations for supranational bodies, and state and non-state actors.
AbstractThe European Convention system has a unique structure among regional human rights regimes. Not only does it have a full-time Court and a Parliamentary Assembly, it is also the only system to have a political body, the Committee of Ministers, tasked with monitoring the implementation of judgments issued by the Court. While the day-to-day work is carried out by the Department for the Execution of Judgments (‘Execution Department’), the ministers’ deputies meet quarterly to examine the implementation (or ‘execution’) of (selected) judgments. How effective has this distinctive institutional arrangement been, and what challenges does it face in an era of increasing hostility to supranational human rights bodies? Anne-Katrin Speck, Research Associate with the Human Rights Law Implementation Project, discussed these questions with Andrew Drzemczewski, former Head of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Department of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Christos Giakoumopoulos, Director General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe; and Michael O’Boyle, former Deputy Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has limited tools to respond to rule of law backsliding by member states. Sanctions have never been used for this purpose, and the Assembly’s monitoring procedure—the most significant tool of scrutiny—presents a mixed picture. This article focuses on four states exhibiting severe rule of law backsliding: Hungary, which has evaded the procedure; Poland, which was placed under monitoring in 2020; Turkey, which in 2017 became the first state to have monitoring reopened; and Azerbaijan, which has been under monitoring since 2001. Through a first-ever analysis of debates, voting patterns, and tactics used in the Assembly, the article elucidates how proponents and opponents of monitoring have framed their arguments in the battleground of ideas about democracy and the rule of law in Europe. It concludes that the Assembly should fundamentally reappraise monitoring—and the possible use of sanctions—to meet the severity of the challenge.
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