Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to Bembodiment^ or Bgrounding.^ We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations , is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations Binteract,^ and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized-the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to Bgrounding.^ Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations-conceptual vs. sensory-motor-from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specific-ity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions , intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of Bgrounding^ or Bembodiment,^ because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.

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The present experiment identified neural regions that represent a class of concepts that are independent of perceptual or sensory attributes. During functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning, participants viewed names of social groups (e.g. Atheists, Evangelicals, and Economists) and performed a one-back similarity judgment according to 1 of 2 dimensions of belief attributes: political orientation (Liberal to Conservative) or spiritualism (Spiritualist to Materialist). By generalizing across a wide variety of social groups that possess these beliefs, these attribute concepts did not coincide with any specific sensory quality, allowing us to target conceptual, rather than perceptual, representations. Multi-voxel pattern searchlight analysis was used to identify regions in which activation patterns distinguished the 2 ends of both dimensions: Conservative from Liberal social groups when participants focused on the political orientation dimension, and spiritual from Materialist groups when participants focused on the spiritualism dimension. A cluster in right precuneus exhibited such a pattern, indicating that it carries information about belief-attribute concepts and forms part of semantic memory—perhaps a component particularly concerned with psychological traits. This region did not overlap with the theory of mind network, which engaged nearby, but distinct, parts of precuneus. These findings have implications for the neural organization of conceptual knowledge, especially the understanding of social groups.

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Reading an action verb elicits the retrieval of its associated body movements as well as its typical goal-the outcome to which it is directed. Two fMRI experiments are reported in which retrieval of goal attributes was isolated from retrieval of motoric ones by contrasting actions that are either done intentionally (e.g., drink) and thus have associated goal information or by accident (e.g., hiccup). Orthogonally, the actions also varied in their motoricity (e.g., drink vs. imagine). Across both levels of motoricity, goal-directedness influenced the activity of a portion of left posterior inferior parietal lobe (pIPL). These effects were not explicable by the grammatical properties, imageability, or amount of body movement associated with these different types of verbs. In contrast, motoricity (across levels of goal-directedness) activated primarily the left middle temporal gyrus. Furthermore, pIPL was found to be distinct from the portion of left parietal lobe implicated in theory of mind, as localized in the same participants. This is consistent with the observation that pIPL contains many functionally distinct subregions and that some of these support conceptual knowledge. The present findings illustrate that, in particular, the pIPL is involved in representing attributes of intentional actions, likely their typical goals, but not their associated body movements. This result serves to describe an attribute-selective semantic subsystem for at least one type of nonmotor aspect of action knowledge.

When learning about events through visual experience, one must not only identify which events are visually similar but also retrieve those events’ associates—which may be visually dissimilar—and recognize when different events have similar predictive relations. How are these demands balanced? To address this question, we taught participants the predictive structures among four events, which appeared in four different sequences, each cued by a distinct object. In each, one event (“cause”) was predictably followed by another (“effect”). Sequences in the same relational category had similar predictive structure, while across categories, the effect and cause events were reversed. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging data, we measured “associative coding,” indicated by correlated responses between effect and cause events; “perceptual coding,” indicated by correlated responses to visually similar events; and “relational category coding,” indicated by correlated responses to sequences in the same relational category. All three models characterized responses within the right middle temporal gyrus (MTG), but in different ways: Perceptual and associative coding diverged along the posterior to anterior axis, while relational categories emerged anteriorly in tandem with associative coding. Thus, along the posterior–anterior axis of MTG, the representation of the visual attributes of events is transformed to a representation of both specific and generalizable relational attributes.

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