This paper is motivated by the success of YouTube, which is attractive to content creators as well as corporations for its potential to rapidly disseminate digital content. The networked structure of interactions on YouTube and the tremendous variation in the success of videos posted online lends itself to an inquiry of the role of social influence. Using a unique data set of video information and user information collected from YouTube, we find that social interactions are influential not only in determining which videos become successful but also on the magnitude of that impact. We also find evidence for a number of mechanisms by which social influence is transmitted, such as (i) a preference for conformity and homophily and (ii) the role of social networks in guiding opinion formation and directing product search and discovery. Econometrically, the problem in identifying social influence is that individuals' choices depend in great part upon the choices of other individuals, referred to as the reflection problem. Another problem in identification is to distinguish between social contagion and user heterogeneity in the diffusion process. Our results are in sharp contrast to earlier models of diffusion, such as the Bass model, that do not distinguish between different social processes that are responsible for the process of diffusion. Our results are robust to potential self-selection according to user tastes, temporal heterogeneity and the reflection problem. Implications for researchers and managers are discussed.

This paper examines renegotiation design in contracts for outsourced information technology (IT) services. Whereas prior literature in information systems has highlighted the likelihood of ex post rent seeking engendered by renegotiation, we build upon literature on incomplete contracts to posit that renegotiation can be Pareto improving by incorporating contingencies revealed ex post. Research on contract renegotiation has been hampered by two sets of challenges: the lack of appropriate data and empirical challenges in identification. We circumvent this problem both by appropriate data collection and by employing an identification strategy to address alternate causal explanations. We propose a measure, Pareto improving amendments, to assess renegotiation outcomes that enhance the value from outsourcing by hazard equilibration and by incorporating learning. Using a unique sample of 141 IT outsourcing contracts, we examine the role of decision rights delineated ex ante in enabling Pareto improving amendments and in resolving the trade-off between adaptation and rent seeking. We find that flexibility provisions, termination for convenience rights, and contractual rights whereby vendors are granted rights to reuse know-how are associated with Pareto improving amendments. The results are robust to potential endogeneity of contractual provisions when parties have feasible foresight and to the possibility of adverse selection in the sample. We also examine alternate explanations from the literature on contractual breach. Implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed. This paper was accepted by Sandra Slaughter, information systems.

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karhade@ust.hk T he complexity and scope of outsourced information technology (IT) demands relationship-specific investments from vendors, which, when combined with contract incompleteness, may result in underinvestment and inefficient bargaining, referred to as the holdup problem. Using a unique data set of over 100 IT outsourcing contracts, we examine whether contract extensiveness, i.e., the extent to which firms and vendors can foresee contingencies when designing contracts for outsourced IT services, can alleviate holdup. While extensively detailed contracts are likely to include a greater breadth of activities outsourced to a vendor, task complexity makes it difficult to draft extensive contracts. Furthermore, extensive contracts may still be incomplete with respect to enforcement. We then examine the role of nonprice contractual provisions, contract duration, and extendibility terms, which give firms an option to extend the contract to limit the likelihood of holdup. We also validate the ex post efficiency of contract design choices by examining renewals of contracting agreements.