Since the use of business analytics promises automation of business processes and time savings, the budgeting process seems predestined for the integration of analytical methods. Therefore, this study examines the determinants of the use of business analytics in the budgeting process and its effect on satisfaction with the budgeting process. Specifically, we focus on one technical determinant (data infrastructure sophistication) and the importance of the two major budgeting functions (the planning and the evaluation function), which could affect the degree of dissemination of using analytical methods. Based on a survey among German companies, we find, as predicted, that the sophistication of the data infrastructure is positively associated with the use of business analytics in the budgeting process. Further, the more a company emphasizes the planning function, the greater the extent to which business analytics is used in the budgeting process. In contrast, we find no association between the evaluation function and the use of business analytics in the budgeting process. Finally, we find that the use of business analytics is positively associated with satisfaction with the budgeting process. Thus, the use of business analytics can help to overcome dissatisfaction with traditional budgeting systems. Overall, our findings provide practitioners with valuable indications under which circumstances the use of analytical methods appears reasonable.

This article examines factors influencing the creation of budgetary slack under budget-based incentive schemes. Classical agency theory serves as the starting point, with the dual role of budgeting as a planning and a motivational instrument. Under the assumption of fully rational utility maximizers, people should incorporate the maximum amount of budgetary slack possible given budget-related compensation. However, this behavior cannot be observed in reality or in experimental settings. Therefore, two important questions remain partially unanswered with regard to explaining the phenomenon of budgetary slack: First, why do individuals not maximize their own utility through budgetary slack? And, second, why is budgetary slack not eliminated completely due to reasons leading to the first question? Behavioral accounting research in this area has gained significant importance in the last years. In this domain, we focus on studies employing the psychological theories of social preferences, organizational justice, and moral disengagement and present primarily experimental as well as survey-based field research findings. The analysis leads to suggestions for further research in this area.

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This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee’s immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company’s performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others’ PINC expectations and (4) others’ PINC behavior, both arising from the employee’s immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management’s main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees’ immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees’ PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct.

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