In view of the challenges posed by climate change and the increasingly ambitious climate targets around the world, the search for effective climate policy instruments is gaining momentum. Carbon pricing, for example, in the form of a carbon tax, and its effects are therefore attracting increasing attention in academic as well as policy discussions. We review the empirical effects of carbon taxes with regard to several impact dimensions commonly studied in the literature: environmental effectiveness, macroeconomic effects, impacts on competitiveness and innovation, distributional implications, and public acceptance. An increasing body of empirical studies shows that carbon taxes can effectively reduce carbon emissions or at least dampen their growth while not negatively affecting economic growth, employment, and competitiveness. The existing empirical evidence suggests that the distributional impact of carbon taxes depends on the type of energy use and the indicators to capture distributional effects, as well as on household characteristics. Lump‐sum transfers are shown to be better suited to mitigate regressive effects for lower incomes, while higher incomes benefit more from a reduction of labor taxes. Public acceptance of carbon taxes can be increased by providing public information, avoiding negative distributional effects, and channeling part of the revenues into "environmental projects."

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Stringency and Distribution in the EU Emissions Trading SchemeThe 2005 Evidence SummaryWith the release of the verified emissions for installations covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for the first trading year 2005 we are able to compare actual emissions and allowances for each installation. Based on data available for 24 Member States as of January 2007, this paper uses a thorough data analysis for about 9,900 installations to investigate evidence on three issues: first, the stringency of the total allocation cap and allocation differences both among the Member States and a selection of emission intensive sectors; second, the distribution of the size of installations; and third, the spread of allocation discrepancies and possible allocation biases regarding the size of installations.

Based on the verified emissions for the 2005 and 2006 trading years, the actual emissions and allowances for each installation covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) were compared. Based on data available for 24 Member States as of May 2007, this article uses a thorough data analysis for about 9,900 installations to investigate evidence on three issues: first, the stringency of the total allocation cap and allocation differences both among the Member States and a selection of emissionintensive sectors; second, the distribution of the size of installations; and third, the spread of allocation discrepancies and possible allocation biases regarding the size of installations. There is a surprisingly high spread of allocation discrepancies, which provide evidence for treating small installations differently from large ones: the inequality of distribution of the size of installations, between allocated and verified allowances, variations in the spread of the allocation discrepancies both by country and by sector reflecting the implementation of National Allocation Plans, the size of an installation and its allocation discrepancy. A partir des émissions vérifiées pour les transactions des années 2005 et 2006, les émissions réelles de chaque installation couverte par le système européen d'échange d'émissions (EUETS) sont comparées avec leur quotas alloués. Sur la base de données sur 24Etats membres accessibles à partir de mai 2007, cet article applique une analyse de données rigoureuse sur environ 9900 installations dans le but de clarifier trois enjeux: premièrement, la rigueur du montant total des quotas et les différences d'allocation entre Etats membres et entre certains secteurs à fortes émissions; deuxièmement, la répartition en fonction de la taille des installations; et troisièmement, les écarts d'allocation et une distortion possible en fonction de la taille des installations. L'étendue des écarts entre les quotas alloués est surprenant, montrant la différence de traitement des petites installations par rapports aux grandes: l'inéquité dans la répartition de la taille des installations, entre quotas alloués et quotas vérifiés, la façon dont les écarts d'allocation varient selon le pays ou le secteur, reflétant la manière dont les plans nationaux d'allocation ont été mis en oeuvre, la taille d'une installation et la distortion relative à l'allocation dont elle a été objet.Mots clés: Echange de droits d'émissions; politiques climatiques; système européen d'échange de quotas

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Despite the success of the German Energiewende in increasing the production of electricity from renewables and the positive global spillover effects of renewable technologies, one of the lessons learned is the insight that simply shifting to renewables and recommending improving energy efficiency is not sufficient to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Combined with the expected radical change of technologies, this requires a more profound understanding of our energy systems. Therefore, in contrast to many conventional energy economy approaches, we propose a deepened structural analysis that covers the full energy value chain from the required functionalities for mechanical, thermal and specific electric energy services via application and transformation technologies up to primary energy. This deepened structural approach opens and substantially enhances our understanding of policy designs that are compatible with the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals. We discover the essential role of four energy grids, namely for electricity, heat, gas, and information as the key for integrating all components of a newly structured energy system. Consequently, we conclude that policy strategies focusing on individual components of an energy system like shifting to renewables may, from a comprehensive perspective on more sustainable energy systems, prove even counterproductive.The deepened structural approach to modeling energy systems identifies at least three layers that are embedded in an onion-like shape. At its core is the physical system that interacts with the socio-economic system. Both are exposed to the institutional system with its mechanisms for coordination and incentives. We provide in a nutshell the building blocks of this modeling approach, which are the defining characteristics of a model family under the acronym sGAIN (sustainable general analysis of innovative notions). More details can be found in [18].

EU climate and energy policy defines ambitious objectives for the Member States, requiring a fundamental change in energy systems. In an interdisciplinary approach, starting with welfare-generating energy services instead of energy flows, we analyse restructuring options for the Austrian energy system. We extend the concept of stabilization wedges by Pacala and Socolow and integrate technological and behavioural options into a structural energy model, complemented by an economic evaluation in an input-output analysis. We apply the energy service based approach to a transformation of the Austrian energy system that meets the EU 2020 emission targets. We estimate that this would require on average additional investment of about 6 billion € p.a. over a twelve year period. This investment allows to tap savings in operating costs (predominantly energy costs) of up to 4.3 billion € at the end of the period, when using a conservative assumption of non-rising energy prices.