We assess the competitive impact that single-market banks and thrift institutions have on multi-market banks (and vice-versa) in 1,884 non-MSA markets. We estimate a model of equilibrium market structure which endogenizes entry for three types: multi-market banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. Observed market structures and the solution to an entry-type game identify the parameters of a latent (unobserved) profit function. We find significant evidence of product differentiation-particularly in the case of thrifts. Furthermore, product differentiation appears to depend upon differences in market geography.
We assess competition among retail depository institutions in 1,884 rural markets. We estimate an equilibrium market structure model that endogenizes the operating decisions of three types of depository institutions: multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrift institutions. Observed market structures and a game-theoretic specification of entry behavior identify the parameters of an underlying profit function. We find strong evidence that product differentiation generates additional profits for retail depository institutions. These profits help to maintain smaller banks and thrifts, even as larger banks expand their operations. Consumers have more options, as more institutions can profitably operate as a result of product differentiation. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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