Resumen. Frente a tres décadas de objeciones a la concepción expresiva de las normas, tal como fue presentada por Alchourrón y Bulygin, el autor de este trabajo pretende demostrar, primero, que un expresivista que asumiera la propuesta de los dos maestros argentinos puede dar cuenta de los estados de cosas facultativos sin introducir incoherencias dentro del sistema normativo; segundo, que también puede describir con éxito el contenido proposicional de una metarregla sin dar contenido semántico al indicador de fuerza (normativa) de la regla-objeto; y tercero, que puede dar cuenta de una clausura permisiva aun cuando niegue la autonomía conceptual de los actos de permisión. A partir de estas demostraciones, el trabajo cierra sugiriendo una solución para una adecuada representación expresivista de las normas condicionales.Palabras clave: teoría lógica de los sistemas normativos, reglas de preferencia, clausura permisiva, metarreglas, normas condicionales. In defence of the expressive conception of normsAbstRAct. Against three decades of objections made to the expressive conception of norms as presented by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the author of this paper purports to demonstrate, first, that their Expressivist accounts for facultative states of affairs without introducing inconsistencies into the normative system; second, that she can successfully describe the propositional content of a meta-rule without semanticizing the indicator of (normative) force of the object-rules; and third, that she can give an account of permissive closure even if she does not grant conceptual autonomy of acts of permitting. On the basis of these demonstrations, the author closes the paper with a suggestive solution for an adequate expressivist representation of conditional norms.
We explain three phenomena in legal discourse in terms of MacFarlane's assessmentsensitive semantics: incompatible applications of law, assessments of statements about what is legally the case, and retrospective overruling. The claim is that assessment sensitivity fits in with the view, shared by many legal theorists at least with respect to hard cases, that the final adjudicator's interpretation of legal sources is constitutive of the applied norm. We argue that there are strong analogies between certain kinds of statements in legal discourse as understood in light of that view and discourse about matters of taste and future contingents. Thus, if assessment-sensitive semantics provides a compelling account of discourse about matters of taste and future contingents, then it likewise provides a compelling account of those statements in legal discourse.
Vpra ša nja, ki jih raz la gal ne od loč be iz zi va jo v prav ni in po li tič ni jav nos ti, so očit na, raz um lji va. Tis to, kar ni očit no, kar ni jas no, je sa ma na ra va teh odločb. Spo ren je lah ko nji hov uči nek, za to se upra vi če no po stav lja vpra ša nje, za kaj pri njih sploh gre. Ustav no sod na ob raz lo ži tev tip sko opre de lju je razla gal ne od loč be kot ta ke, ki za kon pu šča jo v ve lja vi, hkra ti pa iz prav ne ga re da iz lo ča jo tis ti po men ali tis to raz la go, ki je ne us tav na (U-I-108/91). Temu okvi ru pa iz rek ta kih ustav no sod nih od ločb po gos to ne ustre za. Vzo rec iz re ka, ki ga po vze mam iz ve či ne iz da nih raz la gal nih od ločb, se na mreč glasi, da »za kon ni v ne sklad ju z usta vo, če se raz la ga ta ko« ...-Ustav no so dišče s tem iz po stav lja ne ko pri mer no raz la go. Tak iz rek ne »iz lo ča« (kot bi lah ko raz ume li iz ob raz lo žit ve), pač pa prej us mer ja in da je ne kak šno na poti lo o tem, ka te ra raz la ga je »pra va«, to rej ustav na. Raz la gal na od loč ba pa zato »iz lo ča« kveč je mu po sred no-v ob raz lo žit vi-in to še le po uče nju ustav-11 U STAVNOSODNO PRAVOTVORJE REVIJA ZA EVROPSKO USTAVNOST 1 E-pošt ni na slov av tor ja: ak.kri stan@si ol.net.
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