Résumé Cette introduction remplit trois fonctions. Premièrement, je précise le contenu de l’idée de tournant institutionnel vers la justice restaurative. Deuxièmement, j’identifie trois positions centrales partagées par les auteurs qui écrivent pour ce numéro collectif. Ces positions sont les suivantes : celle du convergentisme (entre l’idéal de la restauration et la pratique pénale), celle de l’optimisme (concernant l’efficience institutionnelle de l’idéal de la justice restaurative) et celle du comparativisme (entre différentes manières de traiter le problème du crime). Troisièmement, j’interprète l’orientation générale de notre justification du tournant institutionnel vers la justice restaurative dans les termes de la théorie politique activiste.
Michael S. Moore is among the most prominent normative theorists to argue that retributive justice, understood as the deserved suffering of offenders, justifies punishment. Moore claims that the principle of retributive justice is pervasively supported by our judgments of justice and sufficient to ground punishment. We offer an experimental assessment of these two claims, (1) the pervasiveness claim, according to which people are widely prone to endorse retributive judgments, and (2) the sufficiency claim, according to which no non-retributive principle is necessary for justifying punishment. We test these two claims in a survey and a related survey experiment in which we present participants (N =~900) with the stylized description of a criminal case. Our results seem to invalidate claim (1) and provide mixed results concerning claim (2). We conclude that retributive justice theories which advance either of these two claims need to reassess their evidential support. OPEN ACCESSCitation: Bauer PC, Poama A (2020) Does suffering suffice? An experimental assessment of desert retributivism. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0230304.
Is criminal disenfranchisement compatible with a democratic political order? This article considers this question in light of a recently developed view that criminal disenfranchisement is justified because it expresses our commitment to democratic values. We call this view expressive disenfranchisement and refer to the general conception in which it is grounded as democratic expressivism. Contra supporters of expressive disenfranchisement, we argue that democratic expressivism does not offer a sound justification of criminal disenfranchisement. Additionally, we argue that, insofar as one really cares about answering serious criminal wrongs via an expression of democratic values, criminal disenfranchisement should be abandoned and replaced with a policy that temporarily obliges the relevant criminals to vote. Democratic expressivists should, in other words, move from supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders to endorsing a policy of compulsory criminal voting for a finite period of time.
This paper argues that lay jurors should be given a more extensive position in making decisions about misdemeanour cases. The paper constitutes a qualified defense of the 2011 judicial French reform. This reform associates two extra jurors to the already existing three magistrates in charge of misdemeanour cases. Two arguments are presented in favour of this measure. The first argument is that increasing the number of decision-makers improves the accuracy of verdicts. I call this the argument from quantity. The second argument is that fostering more identity diversity between decision-makers tends to improve the quality of group decisions. I call this the argument from diversity. The argument from quantity and the argument from diversity are supported by the more general idea that one of the chief rationales of any judicial system is that of ensuring the defendants' equality of protection.
Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over electoral outcomes – can justify disenfranchising older citizens. We conclude that equal opportunity of influence cannot ground a blanket disenfranchisement of older people and that, taken in conjunction with other general considerations that apply to all sound electoral policies, partial disenfranchisement proposals (i.e. proposals for reducing the electoral influence of older citizens via age-weighted voting) are both quasi-inapplicable and practically unrobust across a relevant range of political contexts.
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