Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the specifics of the relationship between audit committee characteristics and earnings management in Russian listed companies. This research is driven by the possibility of placing this relationship within the context of a specific institutional environment for company performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply a panel study of 184 Russian listed companies for the period 2014–2018. In addition to the standard fixed effects model, the authors test the results for potential endogeneity with two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis. Findings The results show that audit committee representation on the board of directors results in some mitigation of earnings management. Results reveal that a higher level of audit committee independence and the presence of financial expertise on the committee are associated with lower earnings management. However, companies with relatively busy directors on audit committees are more inclined to practice earnings management. The study’s findings hold after testing for endogeneity of audit committee independence. The authors also reveal that some audit committee characteristics (for example, audit committee independence; its level of expertise) alleviate earnings management in listed state-owned companies (SOEs) more strongly than in listed non-SOEs. Originality/value The results add to the ongoing debate on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management in emerging markets by taking into account the type of ownership (state-owned vs private) as a moderating variable. This study reveals, in particular, that the effect of certain audit committee characteristics on earnings management is more prominent in listed SOEs than in listed non-SOEs.