Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy of religion, arguing that practical and contextual as well as alethic considerations are properly central to the discipline.In a 2010 paper in Religious Studies, Stephen Law challenges theists to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent God (classical theism) should be considered more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil God (Law (2010); see also Madden and Hare (1968);Cahn (1976); Stein (1990);New (1993)). The two hypotheses seem to be equally probable explanations for the existence and nature of the universe, and also to face comparable problems. While classical theism is challenged by the problem of evil, the evil-God hypothesis is challenged by the problem (i.e. existence) of good -of the beauty of nature, human love and compassion, health and laughter. Not only the formulation of the problems, but possible responses to it (or 'reverse theodicies'), are broadly symmetrical. So, for example, evil-God proponents can explain why humans sometimes choose the good (which evil-God hates) by appealing to the idea that evil-God allows free-will so that humans can be held morally responsible for evil acts, and to enable the possibility of genuine moral evil (Law (2010), 357). Reflecting soul-making theodicy, reverse theodicists can claim that, far from being soul-making, the world is in fact a vale of soul-destruction. Natural beauty and the health, wealth, and beauty of some people are provided in order to provide contrast, without which we would cease to perceive fully the ugliness of the world (Law (2010), 358).Mirroring the claim that some people need to suffer in order to allow others to practice