Why not believe in an evil God? Pragmatic encroachment and some implications for philosophy of religion

Abstract

Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy of religion, arguing that practical and contextual as well as alethic considerations are properly central to the discipline.In a 2010 paper in Religious Studies, Stephen Law challenges theists to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent God (classical theism) should be considered more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil God (Law (2010); see also Madden and Hare (1968);Cahn (1976); Stein (1990);New (1993)). The two hypotheses seem to be equally probable explanations for the existence and nature of the universe, and also to face comparable problems. While classical theism is challenged by the problem of evil, the evil-God hypothesis is challenged by the problem (i.e. existence) of good -of the beauty of nature, human love and compassion, health and laughter. Not only the formulation of the problems, but possible responses to it (or 'reverse theodicies'), are broadly symmetrical. So, for example, evil-God proponents can explain why humans sometimes choose the good (which evil-God hates) by appealing to the idea that evil-God allows free-will so that humans can be held morally responsible for evil acts, and to enable the possibility of genuine moral evil (Law (2010), 357). Reflecting soul-making theodicy, reverse theodicists can claim that, far from being soul-making, the world is in fact a vale of soul-destruction. Natural beauty and the health, wealth, and beauty of some people are provided in order to provide contrast, without which we would cease to perceive fully the ugliness of the world (Law (2010), 358).Mirroring the claim that some people need to suffer in order to allow others to practice

The evil-god challenge: extended and defended

“…In a recent Religious Studies article, Anastasia Philippa Scrutton appeals to the pragmatic encroachment account of epistemic justification in support of her argument that the good-god thesis is epistemically more justified than is the evil-god thesis (Scrutton (2016), passim ). In short, she contends that because we are better off believing, and acting as if, the good god hypothesis were true, but worse off believing and acting as if the evil god hypothesis were true, we are more epistemically justified in believing in the good god, even if there is evidential parity for the two hypotheses.…”

“…Most of the pragmatic encroachment literature focuses more on knowledge than on justification, but if knowledge (broadly speaking) entails justified belief, then if KA holds then JA holds too. (Scrutton (2016), 348)This is fallacious. KA does not entail JA, even provided that knowledge entails justified belief.…”

The Evil‐god challenge Part II: Objections and responses

“…Some critics maintain that although the EGH is not logically impossible, it is not as epistemologically plausible as the GGH despite the symmetry thesis standing. In her paper, Anastasia Scrutton claims that although the EGH is broadly similar in reasonableness to the GGH, there is good reason to believe in the latter over the former because it is more pragmatically desirable. Drawing on pragmatic encroachment, Scrutton claims that it is better to believe in Good‐god than Evil‐god because belief in a malevolent deity is detrimental to individual well‐being and societal well‐being, whereas belief in a benevolent deity is beneficial in these regards.…”

Truth, consequences, and the Evil-god challenge: a response to Anastasia Scrutton

“…Anastasia Scrutton (2016) offers a unique response to Law's challenge. She argues that although the two hypotheses may be alethically equal, belief in the GGH is more justified than belief in the EGH because (i) it is better for one's well-being and (ii) it produces better moral consequences.…”