The tendency of the media to depict the Supreme Court as inherently apolitical, some scholars argue, is part of the reason that many believe in the "myth of legality" in which the Court is perceived to operate above the ideological skirmishes of everyday politics. Our experimental analyses show that citizens react more negatively to press reports of a politically motivated Court than they do to coverage portraying a Court that strictly follows legal guidelines. Interestingly, our results also suggest that it is not so much the perceived absence of political wrangling among justices but rather it is the presence of legal guidelines driving the outcome that is the source of the perception of fairness.

This paper draws on an original survey and on the 2004 NES to explore the complexity of contemporary American conservatism. In both datasets, we find evidence that economic and cultural conservatism stand as distinct strands of conservative attitudes. The original survey also allows us to further explore the role of beliefs about the market in economic conservatism. In the end, we find little support for either liberal hopes of fundamental ideological conflict among conservatives or conservative hopes of ideological fusion. Instead, our data suggests that a particular type of ideological coexistence among economic and cultural conservatives is the norm.

Elections from time to time are widely believed to carry a mandate, to express a message about changed policy preferences of the electorate. Whatever the accuracy of such beliefs-a matter about which we are skeptical-perceptions of a mandate should affect the behavior of actors in government. Politicians lack the scholarly luxury of waiting for careful analyses. They must act in the months following elections. We postulate that many will act as if the mandate perceptions were true, veering away from their normal voting patterns. This is driven by election results and interpretations that undermine old calculations about what voters want. As the flow of information gradually changes these perceptions, and the election becomes more distant, members of Congress return to their normal position. We first ask, how would members observe an emerging consensus of mandate? And then we model the duration of the change in behavior in an event-history framework. That permits a depiction of important movements of the median member and, from this, inferences about policy impact.

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