Summary The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) has a near-ubiquitous presence in the neuroscience of cognitive control. It has been implicated in a diversity of functions, from reward processing and performance monitoring to the execution of control and action selection. Here, we propose that this diversity can be understood in terms of a single underlying function: allocation of control based on an evaluation of the expected value of control (EVC). We present a normative model of EVC that integrates three critical factors: the expected payoff from a controlled process, the amount of control that must be invested to achieve that payoff, and the cost in terms of cognitive effort. We propose that dACC integrates this information, using it to determine whether, where and how much control to allocate. We then consider how the EVC model can explain the diverse array of findings concerning dACC function.

In spite of its familiar phenomenology, the mechanistic basis for mental effort remains poorly understood. Although most researchers agree that mental effort is aversive and stems from limitations in our capacity to exercise cognitive control, it is unclear what gives rise to those limitations and why they result in an experience of control as costly. The presence of these control costs also raises further questions regarding how best to allocate mental effort to minimize those costs and maximize the attendant benefits. This review explores recent advances in computational modeling and empirical research aimed at addressing these questions at the level of psychological process and neural mechanism, examining both the limitations to mental effort exertion and how we manage those limited cognitive resources. We conclude by identifying remaining challenges for theoretical accounts of mental effort as well as possible applications of the available findings to understanding the causes of and potential solutions for apparent failures to exert the mental effort required of us.

Debates over the function(s) of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) have persisted for decades. So too have demonstrations of the region's association with cognitive control. Researchers have struggled to account for this association and, simultaneously, dACC's involvement in phenomena related to evaluation and motivation. We describe a recent integrative theory that achieves this goal. It proposes that dACC serves to specify the currently optimal allocation of control by determining the overall expected value of control (EVC), thereby licensing the associated cognitive effort. The EVC theory accounts for dACC's sensitivity to a wide array of experimental variables, and their relationship to subsequent control adjustments. Finally, we contrast our theory with a recent theory proposing a primary role for dACC in foraging-like decisions. We describe why the EVC theory offers a more comprehensive and coherent account of dACC function, including dACC's particular involvement in decisions regarding foraging or otherwise altering one's behavior.

According to prominent models in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and economics, effort (be it physical or mental) is costly: when given a choice, humans and non-human animals alike tend to avoid effort. Here, we suggest that the opposite is also true and review extensive evidence that effort can also add value. Not only can the same outcomes be more rewarding if we apply more (not less) effort, sometimes we select options precisely because they require effort. Given the increasing recognition of effort’s role in motivation, cognitive control, and value-based decision-making, considering this neglected side of effort will not only improve formal computational models, but also provide clues about how to promote sustained mental effort across time.

Previous theories predict that human dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) should respond to decision difficulty. An alternative theory has been recently advanced which proposes that dACC evolved to represent the value of “non-default,” foraging behavior, calling into question its role in choice difficulty. However, this new theory does not take into account that choosing whether or not to pursue foraging-like behavior can also be more difficult than simply resorting to a “default.” The results of two neuroimaging experiments show that dACC is only associated with foraging value when foraging value is confounded with choice difficulty; when the two are dissociated, dACC engagement is only explained by choice difficulty, and not the value of foraging. In addition to refuting this new theory, our studies help to formalize a fundamental connection between choice difficulty and foraging-like decisions, while also prescribing a solution for a common pitfall in studies of reward-based decision making.

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Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one's more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.

Many important moral decisions, particularly at the policy level, require the evaluation of choices involving outcomes of variable magnitude and probability. Many economic decisions involve the same problem. It is not known whether and to what extent these structurally isomorphic decisions rely on common neural mechanisms. Subjects undergoing fMRI evaluated the moral acceptability of sacrificing a single life to save a larger group of variable size and probability of dying without action. Paralleling research on economic decision making, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum were specifically sensitive to the "expected moral value" of actions, i.e., the expected number of lives lost/saved. Likewise, the right anterior insula was specifically sensitive to outcome probability. Other regions tracked outcome certainty and individual differences in utilitarian tendency. The present results suggest that complex life-and-death moral decisions that affect others depend on neural circuitry adapted for more basic, self-interested decision making involving material rewards.