No abstract

We used social information processing theory to examine the effect of work-family conflict (WFC) at the work group level on individuals' experience of WFC. Consistent with hypotheses, results suggest that WFC at the work group level influences individual WFC over and above the shared work environment and job demands. It was also observed that work group support and demographic dissimilarity moderate this relationship. Moderator analyses suggest that work group social support buffers WFC for individuals but is also associated with a stronger effect of work group WFC on individuals' WFC. Moreover, the work group effect on individuals' WFC was shown to be stronger for individuals who were demographically dissimilar to the work group in terms of sex and number of dependents. The interpretations and implications of these findings are discussed.

The paper compares behavior in economic dictator game experiments played with actual money (amounts given by "dictator" subjects) with behavior in hypothetical dictator game experiments where subjects indicate what they would give, although no money is actually exchanged. The average amounts transferred in the two experiments are remarkably similar. Moreover, we uncover meaningful individual differences in real and hypothetical allocations and demonstrate the importance of two personality traits-agreeableness and extraversion-in reconciling them. We conclude that extraverts are "all talk;" agreeable subjects are "for real."

No abstract

Using a longitudinal administrative data set from a large research university, the authors empirically evaluate the consequences of using stop the clock (STC) policies for the career success of tenure track faculty. STC policies were introduced approximately 40 years ago, yet surprisingly little has been written about how they affect career outcomes. The prevalence of the ideal worker norm in academia raises the possibility of negative consequences as evaluators may treat STC policy use as a signal that the faculty member lacks sufficient commitment to his or her academic role. Consistent with this possibility, the authors find that faculty members who stop their clock for family reasons incur a salary penalty relative to faculty members who do not stop their clock, which cannot be explained by differences in productivity. Alternatively, faculty members who use the policy are not at a promotion disadvantage as compared with nonusers, and they actually have higher promotion rates.