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This paper examines the effectiveness of the EU's use of trade to inducing peace in Libya during Gaddafi's final ten years in power, between 2001 and 2011. During this period, the EU implored and reiterated through rhetoric, policy and the exchange of goods and services that trade was to be used as a tool to maintain peace and prevent conflict. However, this paper identifies how this EU policy flopped, specifically due to the policy's failure to take into account the Libyan context, specifically: the Middle Eastern state's ethnographic and historical makeup, WMD program induced sanctions, Gaddafi's rule and the 2011 conflict, each of which amalgamated to ongoing conflict in Libya during Gaddafi's final decade in power.2

From 2005 up until the end of the JPA's first phase in July 2014, the US sought to exploit Iran's economically interdependent foreign ties in order to eradicate the perceived Iranian nuclear threat. This paper analyzes the developments that took place in this timeframe to assess and establish the effectiveness of this economic policy to achieve its security aim. By positing the argument in the economic interdependence-security literature, this paper contributes to the debate and policy concerned with this political economy approach, and highlights the importance of economic and political interests when considering this relationship. By using the US-Iran case study, this paper emphasizes that unilateral actions to economically isolate a state are becoming increasingly impotent. Therefore, for such an economic isolation policy to work, it must be adopted on a multilateral if not universal level.Only then can the economic incentive for the targeted state be used to induce the desired security aims. This paper also provides a commentary on how its conclusions match up to the 2015 JCPOA.

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