We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access service to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum and base stations, and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also, when the providers share their aggregate revenues, developing a rational basis for such sharing is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using transferable payoff coalitional game theory. We first consider the scenario that locations of the base stations and the channels that each provider can use have already been decided apriori. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations of the channels and the base stations to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in this case, i.e. if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each such a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. Next, we show that when the providers can choose the locations of their base stations and decide which channels to acquire, the above results hold in important special cases. Finally, we examine cooperation when providers do not share their payoffs, but still share their resources so as to enhance individual payoffs. We show that the grand coalition continues to be stable. This material is posted here with permission of the IEEE. Such permission of the IEEE does not in any way imply IEEE endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must be obtained from Abstract-We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access service to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum and base stations, and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also, when the providers share their aggregate reve...
We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access service to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum and base stations, and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also, when the providers share their aggregate revenues, developing a rational basis for such sharing is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using transferable payoff coalitional game theory. We first consider the scenario that locations of the base stations and the channels that each provider can use have already been decided apriori. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations of the channels and the base stations to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in this case, i.e. if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each such a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. Next, we show that when the providers can choose the locations of their base stations and decide which channels to acquire, the above results hold in important special cases. Finally, we examine cooperation when providers do not share their payoffs, but still share their resources so as to enhance individual payoffs. We show that the grand coalition continues to be stable. This material is posted here with permission of the IEEE. Such permission of the IEEE does not in any way imply IEEE endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must be obtained from Abstract-We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access service to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multi-hop routes. If providers cooperate, i.e., pool their resources, such as spectrum and base stations, and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, can potentially substantially increase through efficient utilization of resources and statistical multiplexing. The potential of such cooperation can however be realized only if each provider intelligently determines who it would cooperate with, when it would cooperate, and how it would share its resources during such cooperation. Also, when the providers share their aggregate reve...
Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.
Efficacy of proliferation of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large scale cooperation among different providers. If a group of providers cooperate by allowing customers to be served by the resources of the whole group rather than just those of their own providers, they have the potential to utilize their resources more efficiently and enhance the quality of service they can offer. This in turn can result in higher profits for the providers. Such cooperation can, however, be successfully implemented if providers in a coalition judiciously allocate the resources, such as spectrum and base stations, accesspoints, etc., in a way that the individuals payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. Initially, we assume that providers do not share their payoffs. We formulate this problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting, and its equilibrium which can be computed by several practically efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation in a scenario, where customers are also decision makers and decide which provider to subscribe to, based on whether there is cooperation. We then formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend previous results to the cases, where individuals assume more general payoff sharing relations, and their benefits are modeled as "vector payoff functions", comprised of mixed transferable and nontransferable components.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.