Currently, it is assumed that the innovative potential of enterprises is directly linked with the intellectual capital resources. Due to their nature, family businesses may own some unique resources, which may influence the shaping of intellectual capital. Considering the above factors, the aim of the article is to identify and evaluate the variables of intellectual capital in family businesses. The research carried out by the author of this study allows the conclusion that family businesses try to generate intellectual capital. However, there is a noticeable lack of consistency in the actions taken, which as a result may hinder the growth of intellectual capital

Przedsiębiorczość rodzinna -ujęcie teoretyczne1.1. Przedsiębiorczość rodzinna a rozwój teorii przedsiębiorczości 1.2. Istota przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych 1.3. Definicja przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych 1.4. Znaczenie gospodarczo-społeczne przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych 1.5. Wpływ systemu rodziny na funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw rodzinnych Rozdział 2 Strategia sukcesji w świetle badań literaturowych 2.1. Istota strategii sukcesji w przedsiębiorstwach rodzinnych 2.2. Determinanty planowania i implementacji strategii sukcesji 2.3. Modele sukcesji 2.4. Wpływ struktury rodziny na planowanie strategii sukcesji Rozdział 3 Rozdział 4 Wyniki własnych badań empirycznych dotyczących strategii sukcesji w spółkach rodzinnych notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie 4.1. Wstęp 4.2. Charakterystyka próby badawczej 4.3. Metodyka badawcza 4.4. Wyniki badań ilościowych 4.5. Wyniki badań jakościowych Zakończenie Literatura Spis tabel

We study the role of a company founder in its internal governance. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000-2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor-performing founder-CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover, having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreases the likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor-performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.

We study the role of a company founder in the internal governance of firms. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000–2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor‐performing founder‐CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover, having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreases the likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor‐performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.

The article presents a view (on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis) of corporate governance models used in Polish family businesses through financial performance. The empirical analysis covered a sample of 24,000 Polish family businesses in the period of [2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013]. The use of linear regression has allowed the authors to verify the hypothesis concerning the occurrence of differences in profitability ratios in groups of family businesses using variant management models and allowed verifying the relationship between the degree of control and involvement of the owners in management and financial performance. The received results, though inconclusive, indicate that the involvement of the owner in the governance process can affect the financial aspect of a business. The prepared empirical analysis and conclusions of the article contribute to a better understanding of the measures taken on management and control decisions; what is more, they can provide guidance to the owners of family businesses in shaping the corporate governance model.