This article investigates the influence of family involvement on firm performance in an emerging market economy. Using a panel of 217 Polish companies from 1997 to 2005, the authors find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the share of family ownership and firm performance. The data also reveal that firms with family CEOs are likely to outperform their counterparts that have nonfamily CEOs. The results take into account the endogeneity of family ownership and are robust to a number of specification checks.

We examine the interactions of bank lending dynamics, ownership structures, and crisis phenomena in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Using a panel dataset of more than 400 banks for the period from 1994–2010, we show that the impact of ownership structure on a bank’s lending activities in CEE countries was conditional upon the type of crisis, namely, whether it was a host, home, global, or simultaneous crisis. In contrast, our evidence indicates that bank-specific characteristics, such as deposit growth and profitability ratios, are significant determinants of credit growth during both normal economic times and crisis periods, regardless of the crisis type. Moreover, we provide indirect evidence of the benefits of banking sector diversification dependent upon the criterion of parent banks’ country of origin

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We find evidence that an increase in the TDI or its subindices leads to an increase in the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio. These results support the hypothesis that companies with weak shareholder rights pay dividends less generously than do firms with high corporate governance standards. Therefore, minority shareholders often use power to extract dividends. We also find that large and more profitable companies have a higher dividend payout ratio, while riskier and more indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends. Terms of use: Documents in

We examine whether foreign-owned and government-owned banks in Central and Eastern Europe reacted differently during a domestic systematic banking crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008. Our panel dataset comprises data on more than 400 banks for the period 1994-2010. Our analysis shows that foreign banks provided credit during domestic banking crises in host countries, while government-owned banks contracted. In contrast, foreign-owned banks reduced their credit base during the global financial crisis, while government-owned banks expanded. Consequently, our results show that foreign-owned banks may contribute to financial stability during domestic crisis episodes, but also increase the risk of importing instability from abroad during a crisis in their home markets. However, government-owned banks may substitute for foreign-owned banks and hinder the transmission of international shocks. Thus, our results indicate that a mixed banking sector consisting of foreign-owned and government-owned banks is most advisable.