This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in the procurement process. Limited liability causes¯rms in a bad¯nancial situation to bid more aggressively than nancially healthy¯rms in the procurement auction. Therefore, it is likely that the winning¯rm is a¯rm in¯nancial di±culties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper focuses on the regulatory practice of surety bonds to face this problem. We show that the use of surety bonds reduces and sometimes eliminates the problem of abnormally low tenders. We provide a characterization of the optimal surety bond and show that the US practice of requiring that surety bonds cover over 100% of the contract price can be excessive, implying overinsurance to the problem of abnormally low tenders.
Many of the attributes that make a good "socially responsible" (SR) are credence attributes that cannot be learned by consumers either through search or experience. Consumers, then, use for their purchasing decisions "noisy" information about these attributes obtained from potentially contradictory channels (media, advertisement, NGOs) . In this paper we model such informational framework and show the positive relationship between the accuracy of the information transmitted to consumers and corporate social responsibility. We also show that a firm may be tempted to add noise to the information channel (through lobbying of the media), which might reduce the supply of the SR attributes and even harm the firm itself (with lower profits). It might then be profitable to the firm to commit ex ante to not manipulate the information regarding the firm's business practices (e.g., with a partnership with an NGO). Finally, we extend our model to a competition framework endogenizing the number of firms active in the SR segment. We show both that in more transparent markets a larger number of firms will be SR, and that in a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given number of SR firms.
This paper analyzes the interplay between firms' self-regulation (often denoted as corporate social responsibility) as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently high externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods.We thank Guillermo Caruana, Humberto Llavador and a referee for helpful comments. We also benefited from comments by audiences at
This paper attempts to identify some of the main factors affecting a hotel establishment's decision to adopt (or not), and to what extent, socially and environmentally responsible business practices. Salient among the results obtained is the fact that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is likely to be part of a hotel's product differentiation strategy; additionally, it is shown that productivity aspects such as scale economies, as well as the hotel's internal organization, also impact a hotel's CSR strategy.
We study both theoretically and empirically the relationship between different types of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and a firm's product quality. On the one hand, observable external CSR (e.g., a firm's involvement in a social project) can be used as a signal to unobservable product quality. On the other hand, internal CSR (e.g., human resources practices such as training and labor stability) can improve a firm's labor productivity, specially in firms supplying high quality. We show that CSR may serve as a tool for a firm's product differentiation strategy, finding that both internal and external CSR enhance a firm's product quality. Moreover, this implies the existence of complementarity between internal and external CSR (they mutually reinforce each other) through product quality. We test our theoretical results with data from the hotel industry where we show that hotel establishments with a higher product quality are indeed more likely to be socially responsible, both internally and externally, indicative of the existence of complementarity.
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