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is president, American Antitrust Institute, an independent education, research, and advocacy organization (see www.antitrustinstitute.org). 1 The math of my example is simple. A 50% chance of tying and a 50% chance of winning in overtime yields a 25% probability of winning. A 33% chance of winning is better. A ntitrust policy is unbalanced. Like a two-legged stool, it wobbles in a state of disequilibrium. The two legs are law and neoclassical economics. Law comes at the relationship between the state and the private sector through objective rules and remediation for violating authoritative communal norms. Economics comes at it through the decentralized but objective interaction of supply and demand in the market. Missing is the focus on the subjective world of both the firm and the managers who make decisions within the firm and the consumers who purchase from the firm. By providing this perspective, business schools have the potential for making a major contribution to the evolution of antitrust policy. The disciplines of marketing and strategic management can be the third leg that gives the antitrust stool stability. First, business schools possess the ability to help antitrust move beyond neoclassical abstractions about economic man. Second, business schools have something important to say about dynamic economics, which is not captured by neoclassical assumptions. Going Beyond Homo Economicus It is the last game of the March Madness basketball season. The team you coach trails by 2 points, with time for one last shot. Do you go for 2 points to tie or 3 points to win? You know that a 2point shot succeeds about half the time and a 3-point shot about one-third of the time. Time out has been called. The players are clustered around you. How many people would instruct their team to go for a 2-pointer? A 3-pointer? Most coaches reportedly go for 2 points to tie. Why? Because it lowers the risk of sudden loss, and coaches, like most of us, psychologists say, do more to avoid losing than to win. This is not the objectively rational strategy, however. Because a 2-point shot will only tie the game (and force an overtime, in which a team has a 50-50 chance of winning), going for a 3-pointer is a superior strategy. 1 (See Lowenstein 2001.

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In this introduction for nonlawyers to the nation's antitrust laws and institutions and how they are likely to apply to e-commerce, the author argues that it is important for the government to help ensure that the industry will be shaped, during its current malleable phase, along competitive lines.

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This article examines the role of antitrust and competition policy in regulation of large banks made fragile by the financial meltdowns of 2007–09. We compare crisis-related regulation in the European Union and the United States and find that in the European Union, competition policy experts played a key role in applying crisis-related financial regulation, but in the United States they did not. Consequentially, the European Union avoided making banks bigger as a side effect of making weak banks stronger. In the United States, bank consolidation was encouraged. We argue that in the United States, policies to preserve competition should be given a more significant role and made part of an on-going plan that will apply even in a time of crisis. At minimum, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department should be promptly consulted by the prudential regulators of financial institutions on all matters likely to substantially affect the structure of the financial services industry, including market power issues.

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