Previous studies of right-wing populist (RWP) parties primarily investigate how domestic factors as well as external forces, such as immigration, incite the emergence and electoral success of RWP parties. Studies examining the link between migration and far-right support have found mixed empirical results, using various measures of immigration. In this article, we construct our own measures of immigration that highlight the economic and cultural dimensions of migrant-sending states in relation to migrant-receiving states. Our empirical analysis of 15 Western European countries uses these measures to examine whether the economic and cultural characteristics of migrant-sending states can enhance RWP success in wealthy, advanced democracies. We find some evidence that relatively large economic and cultural differences between natives and immigrants are conducive to RWP support in Western European countries. But the findings suggest that future research should identify and examine other factors that strengthen or undermine the extent to which RWP parties can make electoral gains by focusing on immigration.

Education reform has emerged as the main policy priority during the global pandemic. Given the effect of education on individual well-being and macrolevel socioeconomic growth, countries have undertaken a variety of policy measures to offset the negative ramifications of the health outbreak on learning processes. This article examines policy conditions that shape disparities in education policy and learning outcomes across eurozone countries. It argues that sustaining robust education systems in the postpandemic era calls for policy initiatives that strengthen digital literacy and ensure equitable learning opportunities for all student demographics. Examining preexisting education policy and digital literacy, I argue that strengthening partnerships among education stakeholders and making efficient use of resources effectively sets eurozone countries on a path to education recovery. Policy measures that advance the digitalization of learning infrastructures have the capacity to increase human capital and narrow postpandemic socioeconomic disparities among eurozone countries.

The Western Balkans' response to the first wave of COVID‐19 was efficient and swift. The countries’ capacity to mitigate the crisis has been vastly facilitated by EU fiscal disbursements. The funds have enabled governments to implement health and economic policies that counteract the crisis' socioeconomic repercussions. In this article, I examine the temporal effects of EU conditionality on the health outcomes and democratic governance of Balkan states. Identifying three features of the domestic political context—government accountability, the strength of opposition parties, and judicial system effectiveness—I assess the likelihood of divergent effects of the funds on health and democratic outcomes. I argue that while beneficial in the short term, in the long run, the EU funds risk enabling state capture and inadvertently jeopardizing the Western Balkans' post‐pandemic democratic prospects. I empirically substantiate my argument by examining the relationship between prior EU allocations (Instrument for Pre‐Accession Assistance) and clientelism in WB states during 2007–2017.

Migration has become a top policy priority of the European Union (EU) in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis. Given the significant ramifications of non‐European immigration for its member states, the EU has implemented a variety of policies to minimize popular backlashes within the borders of its wealthiest member states, which are also popular final destinations for migrants. In this article, we show that the EU offers financial incentives to its migrant‐transit member countries in exchange for holding migrants traveling from the Middle East and North Africa region within their territories. We use a subnational dataset on Southern Italy to examine the effects of migrant arrivals by boat on the amount of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund received by each autonomous region between 2006 and 2018. In addition, we provide a cross‐national analysis of EU expenditures using data on unauthorized border crossings into the EU between 2009 and 2018. We find robust empirical support for the argument that the EU channels more funds to jurisdictions located on the major migrant‐transit routes.

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