The military bureaucracy today is a highly complex and differentiated structure whose interplay of institutional and interpersonal politics produces an "organized anarchy.” Its anarchical character is reinforced by ambiguities in the international environment and defense policy priorities; the misdirection of problems and misuse of participants within the bureaucracy; the misloading and overloading of the system with information and demands; incompletely understood intrabureaucratic processes; and a combination of selectivity and inattention in the entire decision-making process. The combined effect inhibits efficiency and responsiveness and greatly increases the likelihood of failure. Examples include the flawed linkage between doctrine and force posture, a mismanaged all-volunteer force, the abortive Eagle Claw rescue attempt in Iran, and the chaotic structure known as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Reform is possible, but the political obstacles to be overcome are formidable.
This paper undertakes a comparative case study of the relationship between the onset of interstate crises and the incidence of war. Findings obtained from several different studies are integrated and extended into an analysis of changes in the major-power subsystem between the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 (which was resolved without war) and the Sarajevo Crisis of 1914 (which escalated into the First World War). The outcomes of these crises are examined in the context of the changing pattern of major-power alliances, the distribution and the shift in distribution of major-power capabilities, and the pre-1914 arms race. The author finds a transformation in the major-power subsystem between 1905-1910 which significantly altered the existing European balance of power in favor of the Triple Entente. During the Sarajevo Crisis, the behavior of the decision makers on both sides reflected that transformation. The implications of these findings for conflict theory are summarized.One of the more compelling questions raised in the study of international conflict involves the relationship between the onset of crises and the incidence of war. That is, why do some crises end in war, while others do not? Social scientists of all methodological persuasions have approached this
There is much to be learned from the Weinberger Doctrine. It was a multifaceted declaration with more aspects than would appear to be the case on the surface. Understanding those aspects, and their implications for the use of force by the United States in the Third World, may help this country 'to intervene less often but more successfully than in the past. The analyses in this volume attempt to contribute to that understanding. DD 1473 EDfTION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE EJCI UNCLASSIFIED .' •. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
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