From Bosnia to Sarajevo

Abstract

This paper undertakes a comparative case study of the relationship between the onset of interstate crises and the incidence of war. Findings obtained from several different studies are integrated and extended into an analysis of changes in the major-power subsystem between the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 (which was resolved without war) and the Sarajevo Crisis of 1914 (which escalated into the First World War). The outcomes of these crises are examined in the context of the changing pattern of major-power alliances, the distribution and the shift in distribution of major-power capabilities, and the pre-1914 arms race. The author finds a transformation in the major-power subsystem between 1905-1910 which significantly altered the existing European balance of power in favor of the Triple Entente. During the Sarajevo Crisis, the behavior of the decision makers on both sides reflected that transformation. The implications of these findings for conflict theory are summarized.One of the more compelling questions raised in the study of international conflict involves the relationship between the onset of crises and the incidence of war. That is, why do some crises end in war, while others do not? Social scientists of all methodological persuasions have approached this

Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816-1965

“…Measuring the weight, or power, of a country has been approached in several ways. One method has been to look for concrete power-attributes, or capabilities, which can be used as measures of countries' power (Sabrosky 1975, Knorr 1955. This approach has been criticized on grounds that (1) 'power' should be reserved for the ability of country A to modify the behavior of country B; (2) attributes, such as GNP and military spending, only provide certain tools or capabilities that can be converted into power, and do not represent power itself; (3) power, unlike these attributes, is variable across a limited domain and scope (Dahl 1970, p. 18); (4) the capabilities or power of a set of countries may not be additive when they form an alliance; (5) power is an extremely ambiguous, and perhaps superfluous, concept in social science analysis (Riker 1962(Riker , 1969.…”