Citizen participation in government budgeting processes is a topic that has received attention for many decades. Despite prescriptive exhortations to cities, research in this area has signifi cant limitations. We identify four elements that are believed to infl uence the participation process. Th e variables within each element have received attention in the empirical literature, but no systematic eff ort has been made to uncover interaction eff ects and extend theory to make it more robust. We consider the weaknesses of our knowledge, suggest an impact model of citizen participation in budgeting, and identify hypotheses that may be tested in future research. Technology, Communication, CollaborationCarol Ebdon is the Finance Director for

Citizen participation in the local budget process is not prevalent, despite encouragement from scholars and professional organizations. This case study of two Kansas cities that have used a variety of input mechanisms in the budget process analyzes the effectiveness of citizen budget participation. Limited effectiveness was found, which may largely be due to the timing of the input, unstated or unclear goals, implementation difficulties, and political and environmental constraints. Citizen input appears to have had little effect on budget decisions, and neither city has institutionalized participation in the process. However, the input mechanisms serve other purposes, such as education and support for specific proposals. Describing the benefits as well as the difficulty of involving citizens in a meaningful way is beneficial to other governments as they wrestle with the issue of defining the citizens' role in the budget process.

What participation mechanisms connect citizens and city officials? Do they produce valued outcomes? Surveys of elected officials suggest that microlevel mechanisms such as direct citizen contact are more valuable in meeting participation goals than are mechanisms focusing on macrolevel concerns. However, there is a disconnect between perceptions about value and the use of mechanisms. State-level participation requirements and a city manager have little effect on the value of a mechanism. These findings raise some questions: why are microlevel participation mechanisms favored, why do some mechanisms have value even though respondents have little experience with them, and why is there a misalignment between participatory goals and the mechanisms used?As Jonathan Kahn suggests, budget is government in miniatureFa budget outlines a government's scope of responsibilities, defines its relationship with citizens, and reveals how the government plans to extract resources from private citizens to fund what services and to achieve what goals.

Research on the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act generally has not considered how the strategic plan, annual performance plan, and annual performance report are produced and used. Are the documents good decision and management tools, as the act intends, or are agencies internalizing them to meet the unique needs of their organization? Interviews with representatives of 14 cabinet-level federal agencies suggest that implementation of the act is not standardized. Instead, it is influenced by the unique challenges that agencies face. Further, there is a relationship between the implementation challenges and the overall use of the documents.In early public administration literature, the politicsadministration dichotomy is simply explained as politicians making policy decisions and assigning programs and tasks to government agencies (Wilson 1887). Bureaucrats, in turn, create programs that meet legislative intent. Through laws and statutes, politicians are able to control bureaucrats by specifying the details of implementation, thus assuring consistent implementation. This can be seen as employing a one-size-fits-all mentality that is similar to the "one best way" of the classical theorists (Taylor 1911). Thanks to the neoclassicists (Simon 1945) and other recent theorists (Williams 2000), we know that such proverbs of administration are ill-advised. Yet, in the Government Performance and Results Act (Public Law 102-63), we see exactly this type of behavior by politicians. They attempt to reform government by imposing procedural controls, giving no attention to structures, institutions, and actors. These kinds of actions do not foster visionary governance; instead, they invite micro-level bureaucratic control. They are changes directed at program management, not public policy.In the recent round of reform efforts, Congress and the president used a top-down mandate-the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)-to define and drive the internal processes of federal government agencies. The act requires the development of three documents (strategic plan, annual performance plan, and annual performance report) that together serve as an effective and efficient management tool to inform decision making and budget allocation by external funding sources. It is also meant to open up the planning process to provide points of access for various agency stakeholders. The act requires consultation with internal and external stakeholders during the development of the documents. These documents are linked to the budget requests of each agency in an effort to align performance with resource-allocation decisions. The GPRA specifies a bottom-up implementation process that will yield documents that inform internal management decisions while providing accountability to external stakeholders; thus, it imposes procedural controls rather than addressing structural issues.The paradox of the GPRA is that it uses a top-down, one-size-fits-all policy direction to mandate a bottom-up implementation approach. This to...

End-of-the-year spending sprees by government agencies are viewed generally as an example of government wastefulness. Agency personnel, however, rationalize the practice as a means for protecting their budgets from inexpedient cuts. In Oklahoma, a policy has been adopted that allows agencies to carry over and reprogram year-end surpluses as long as the reprogrammed funds are spent within 16.5 months of the end of the fiscal year. Using agency theory as a theoretical lens, we show that this policy restructures the contract between the principal (legislature) and its agents (state agencies) so that their interests are better aligned, regarding end-of-the-year surpluses.

Most supervisors dread employee discipline and often employ strategies not offi-

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Citizen participation in local government processes is touted as an effective means to enhance responsiveness and accountability. The topic has received considerable attention in the normative literature, yet there is persistent evidence that citizen participation occurs infrequently and has little influence on decision making. This study compares the perspectives of three different groups of stakeholders: elected officials, administrators, and citizens. Examination of the perspectives of these three groups of actors is important because it provides insight into the relationships between the groups and expectations regarding how input is used and how it influences decisions. Attention to these items can make participation more valuable and can inform other governments as they ponder how to align the priorities of different actors in their budgeting processes.