Putting the Brakes on the Rush to Spend Down End‐of‐Year Balances: Carryover Money in Oklahoma State Agencies

Douglas, James W.; Franklin, Aimee L.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00854.x

Cited by 25 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The cancellation of rights to make use of resources unused in the previous fiscal year, which is expressed in the saying "use it or lose it" by Liebman and Mahoney (2013), leads to inefficient use of resources (Alves, 2011;Liebman and Mahoney, 2013). In addition, this rule encourages solutions to extend the use of the resources beyond the fiscal year (Douglas and Franklin, 2006). The situation of unused resources at the end of a fiscal year may occur either because of mismanagement or because of intentional postponement, such as a "buffer" to the uncertainties of the year.…”

Section: Literature On Budget Carry-overmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

Aquino

Azevedo

2017

Rev. Adm. Pública

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This article discusses the use of unpaid commitments and its impacts on the credibility and transparency of public finances. Based on a typification of the four types of existing carry-over in current Brazilian regulation, the article shows evidence of the emergence of a "parallel budget" in the three levels of government with regulation and external control issues. The development of the balances and enrollment of the unpaid commitments was proxied by the sum of these accounts in the Federal Government balance sheet, as well as in 26 States and the Federal District, and for 4,100 cities. Additionally, the interpretation given by the Courts of Auditors for unpaid commitments usage by governments without financial ballast was observed as well as the level of transparency given by those governments with the larger amounts of unpaid commitments. The results indicate that, besides the growing debt, the weak regulation of unverified unpaid commitments is seriously reducing the credibility and transparency of the budget at all levels of government. Keywords: unpaid commitments; public budget; carry-over; indebtedness; transparency. Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentáriaO artigo discute o uso da inscrição em restos a pagar e seus impactos na credibilidade e na transparência do orçamento público. A partir de uma tipificação dos quatro tipos de carry-over existentes na regulação brasileira, articularam-se evidências do surgimento de um "orçamento paralelo" nos três níveis de governo com aspectos de regulamentação e controle externo. A evolução dos saldos e da inscrição de restos a pagar foi captada pelos saldos dessas contas no governo federal, nos governos de 26 estados e Distrito Federal, e em cerca de 4.100 municípios. Adicionalmente, observaram-se a interpretação dada pelos Tribunais de Contas para a inscrição em restos a pagar sem lastro financeiro, assim como o nível de transparência dada pelos governos com maiores saldos de restos a pagar. Os resultados indicam que, além do crescente endividamento, a fraca regulação sobretudo dos restos a pagar não processados está reduzindo seriamente a credibilidade e a transparência do orçamento em todos níveis de governo. Palavras-chave: restos a pagar; orçamento público; carry-over; endividamento, transparência. Compromisos pendientes y la credibilidad del presupuesto públicoEl artículo debate el uso de la inscripción en restante a pagar y sus impactos en la credibilidad y en la transparencia del presupuesto público. A partir de una tipificación de los cuatro tipos de carry-over existentes en la reglamentación brasileña, se articularon evidencias del surgimiento de un "presupuesto paralelo" en los tres niveles del gobierno con aspectos de reglamentación y control externo. La evolución de los saldos y de la inscripción en restante a pagar fue captada de los saldos de tales cuentas en el gobierno federal, en los gobiernos de 26 estados y el Distrito Federal, y cerca de 4.100 municipios. Además, se observó la interpretación dada por los Tribunales de Cuentas para...

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Section: Literature On Budget Carry-overmentioning

confidence: 99%

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

Aquino

Azevedo

2017

Rev. Adm. Pública

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“…He can increase monitoring, change organizational structure, implement bonding, or alter the principal-agent contract (Douglas, 2006). Any of these actions might be the right move in the circumstances, but mismatching problems and actions can prove disastrous.…”

Section: Agency Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"By reducing the amount of time they spend examining detailed line items, they (Congress) will have more time to monitor actual program performance" (Cothran, 1993, p. 446) Using organizational change to promote good practices is not a workable solution because it would have to be implemented at the field-agency level. There is no way Congress could intervene in this microcosm of the federal government, and even if they could they would provoke resistance from the agencies (Douglas, 2006). Nor would bonding work, because the process of generating bonded agents is extremely difficult, and agents would resist the risk of accountability for decisions made outside their control.…”

Section: Agency Theory and The Carryover Incentivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…agreement as to what right behavior entails), or coercive (punishment for acting against the principal's interests [Douglas, 2006]). …”

Section: Agency Theory and The Carryover Incentivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additionally, depending on the efficiency of the agencies close out process, once a year unused funds can be redistributed to meet higher priority needs. (Douglas, 2006). Any carryover reform should retain these advantages.…”

Section: E Disadvantages Of the Carryover Incentivementioning

confidence: 99%

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An Analysis of Year-End Spending and the Feasibility of a Carryover Incentive for Federal Agencies

McPherson¹

2007

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to FUNDING NUMBERS PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)N 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENTApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)This project investigates the year-end "rush to spend" and the origins. A secondary examination considers the feasibility of using carryover incentives to extend the obligation period by up to twelve months. Problems associated with the current one-year limitation are documented. Possible fixes for execution problems are presented, and one solution, the carryover incentive, is looked at in depth. Findings include many examples at both the federal and state levels that suggest year-end spending leads to poor decisions and wasted resources. Despite a history of ineffective budgetary and policy changes the proposed carryover incentive has proven successful in the limited occasions that it has been adopted. NUMBER OF PAGES 7714. SUBJECT TERMS Year-end Spending, Close out, Carryover incentive, Agency Theory PRICE CODE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU AN ANALYSIS OF YEAR-END SPENDING AND THE FEASIBILITY OF A CARRYOVER INCENTIVE FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES ABSTRACTThis project investigates the year-end "rush to spend" and its origins. A secondary examination considers the feasibility of using carryover incentives to extend the obligation period by up to twelve months. Problems associated with the current one-year limitation are documented. Possible fixes for execution problems are presented, and one solution, the carryover incentive, is analyzed in depth. Findings include many examples at both the federal and state levels that suggest year-end spending leads to poor decisions and wasted resources. Despite a history of ineffective budgetary and policy changes the proposed carryover incentive has proven successful in the limited occasions that it has been adopted.

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Bias Associated with Centrally Budgeted Expenditure Forecasts

Calabrese

Williams

2019

The Palgrave Handbook of Government Budget Forecasting

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Putting the Brakes on the Rush to Spend Down End‐of‐Year Balances: Carryover Money in Oklahoma State Agencies

Cited by 25 publications

References 14 publications

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

Restos a pagar e a perda da credibilidade orçamentária

An Analysis of Year-End Spending and the Feasibility of a Carryover Incentive for Federal Agencies

Bias Associated with Centrally Budgeted Expenditure Forecasts

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