There is growing consensus that selection history strongly guides spatial attention and is distinct from current goals and physical salience. Here, we focused on target-location probability cueing: when the target is more likely to appear in one region, search performance gradually improves for targets appearing in that region. Probability cueing is thought to reflect a long-lasting, inflexible and implicit attentional bias. However, strong evidence for these claims is lacking. We re-examined them in four experiments. The target was more likely to appear in one than in the other regions during the learning phase, whereas all regions were equiprobable during the extinction phase. We manipulated set size in all experiments. Probability cueing reduced search slopes during learning and extinction, suggesting that the bias is attentional and long-lasting. Although intertrial priming from several previous trials had an influence, it did not account for all the effects. We also found the bias to be largely inflexible: informing participants that the probability imbalance during learning would be discontinued during extinction did not reduce the bias. Moreover, the acquired bias remained the default determinant of attentional priority when goal-directed guidance failed (i.e., when a cue instructing participants to start their search in a given region during the extinction phase was omitted or invalid). Finally, many more participants than predicted by chance showed awareness of the probability manipulation, although we could not establish whether awareness was associated with the bias. We conclude that probability cueing is a long-lasting and inflexible attentional bias, distinct from intertrial priming.

Scientific theories reflect some of humanity's greatest epistemic achievements. The best theories motivate us to search for discoveries, guide us towards successful interventions, and help us to explain and organize knowledge. Such theories require a high degree of specificity, and specifying them requires modeling skills. Unfortunately, in psychological science, theories are often not precise, and psychological scientists often lack the technical skills to formally specify existing theories. This problem raises the question: How can we promote formal theory development in psychology, where there are many content experts but few modelers? In this paper, we discuss one strategy for addressing this issue: a Many Modelers approach. Many Modelers consist of mixed teams of modelers and non-modelers that collaborate to create a formal theory of a phenomenon. We report a proof of concept of this approach, which we piloted as a three-hour hackathon at the SIPS 2021 conference. We find that (a) psychologists who have never developed a formal model can become excited about formal modeling and theorizing; (b) a division of labor in formal theorizing could be possible where only one or a few team members possess the prerequisite modeling expertise; and (c) first working prototypes of a theoretical model can be created in a short period of time.

People form their judgments of everyday phenomena based on multisensory information. This study investigates the relative impact of visual and auditory information on the perception of running tap water. Two visual and two auditory stimuli were combined to create four different combinations of high and low volumetric flow rate of tap water (the volume of water which passes through a faucet per time unit). Participants in each condition were asked to judge how long it would take to fill up a one-liter water bottle. The results demonstrate that the judgments were significantly influenced by visual and auditory information. Our data suggest that auditory information can play a significant role in everyday experience of running tap water even though participants are normally unaware of the effect of audition. These findings open the door to the idea of using auditory feedback of products in the context of proenvironmental behavior.

Being able to overcome distraction by salient distractors is critical in order to allocate our attention efficiently. Previous research showed that observers can learn to ignore salient distractors endowed with some regularity, such as a high-probability location or feature -a phenomenon known as distractor statistical learning. Unlike goal-directed attentional guidance, the bias induced by statistical learning is thought to be implicit, long-lasting and inflexible. We tested these claims with regard to statistical learning of distractor color in a high-power (N = 160) pre-registered experiment. Participants searched for a known-shape singleton target and a color singleton distractor, when present, appeared most often in one color during the learning phase, but equally often in all possible colors during the extinction phase. We used a sensitive measure of participants' awareness of the probability manipulation. The awareness test was administered after the extinction phase for one group, and after the leaning phase for another group -which was informed that the probability imbalance would be discontinued in the upcoming extinction phase. Participants learned to suppress the high-probability distractor color very fast, an effect partly due to intertrial priming. Crucially, there was only little evidence that the bias survived during extinction. Awareness of the manipulation was associated with reduced color suppression, suggesting that the bias was implicit. Finally, results showed that the awareness test was more sensitive when administered early vs. late. We conclude that learnt color suppression is an implicit bias that emerges and decays rapidly, and discuss the methodological implications of our findings.