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What are the roles of bottom-up and top-down signals in the formation of climate change policy preferences? Using a large sample of American residents (n = 1520) and combining an experimental manipulation of descriptive social norms with two choice experiments, we investigate the effects of descriptive norms and policy endorsements by key political actors on climate policy support. We study these questions in two areas considered to be central in a number of decarbonization pathways: the phase-out of fossil fuel-powered cars and the deployment of carbon capture and storage. Our study provides two important results. First, social norm interventions may be no silver bullet for increasing citizens’ support for ambitious climate policies. In fact, we not only find that climate policy support is unaffected by norm messages communicating an increased diffusion of pro-environmental behaviors, but also that norm messages communicating the prevalence of non-sustainable behaviors decrease policy support. Second, in the presence of policy endorsements by political parties, citizens’ trust in these parties influences their support for climate policies. This study contributes to research in behavioral climate policy by examining the impact of descriptive norms and elite cues on climate policy support.

Why do policy responses to one and the same event often vary so markedly between different jurisdictions? This contribution sheds light on conditions and processes that link crises to policy change or policy stability. Drawing on public policy theories and accounts from crisis management, the type of policy subsystem that is hit by a crisis is theorized to be a decisive factor when it comes to explaining variation in crisis‐induced policy reactions. The theoretical arguments are explored based on a comparative case study of Fukushima's differential impact on nuclear power policymaking in Japan and Germany. In order to systematically analyze interaction patterns of policy elites, the study capitalizes on recent methodological advances and applies a method called discourse network analysis. The analysis yields topographies of policy discourses around the Fukushima crisis in both countries and shows that crises can trigger major policy shifts when “anchors” for policy change—i.e., alternative policy ideas and proposals put forward by a minority coalition—are readily available. If a pre‐crisis subsystem is unitary, on the other hand, the pressure on incumbents is rather low and policy shifts are prevented from going beyond mere incremental adjustments..

Why do junctures become critical in some cases but not in others? Building on the critical juncture framework and perspectives on the formation and diffusion of beliefs, we develop a theoretically parsimonious and empirically traceable account of divergence in institutional outcomes. By illuminating the role of agency and joint belief shifts we further open the "black box" of critical junctures. In particular, we develop the argument that the role agents play is conditioned by conflict lines that structure an institutional field before a juncture sets in. Empirically, we trace political discourses around the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Canada, Germany, and Japan using discourse network analysis. Through comparative investigation, we empirically show that discursive interactions during potential critical junctures indicate institutional outcomes that are shaped by causally relevant historical legacies.

Promoting low-carbon innovation has long been a central preoccupation within both the practice and theory of climate change mitigation. However, deep lock-ins indicate that existing carbon-intensive systems will not be displaced or reconfigured by innovation alone. A growing number of studies and practical initiatives suggest that mitigation efforts will need to engage with the deliberate decline of carbon-intensive systems and their components (e.g., technologies and practices). Yet, despite this realisation, the role of intentional decline in decarbonization remains poorly understood and the literature in this area continues to be dispersed among different bodies of research and disciplines. In response, this article structures the fragmented strands of research engaging with purposive decline, interrogating the role it may play in decarbonization. It does so by systematically surveying concepts with particular relevance for intentional decline, focusing on phase-out, divestment, and destabilization.

Coal-fired power generation is the single most important source of carbon dioxide emissions in many countries, including Germany. A government commission recently proposed to phase out coal by 2038, which implies that the country will miss its 2020 climate target. Based on a representative sample of German voters assessing 31,744 hypothetical policy scenarios in a choice experiment, we show that voters prefer an earlier phase-out by 2025. They would uphold their support for greater climate ambition up to an additional cost to society of €8.50 billion. Voters in Rhineland and Lusatia, the country's main coal regions, support an earlier phase-out, too, although to a lesser extent. By demonstrating that political decision-makers are more reluctant to overcoming energy path dependence than voters, our analysis calls for further research explaining the influence of particular stakeholders in slowing energy transitions. 80 per cent of the world's coal reserves must stay in the ground in order to reach the target of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels 1. Already in 2008, climate scientists had called for a complete divestment from coalfired electricity by 2030 2 , a proposition reiterated by a recent "Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization" 3. Yet, despite the strong growth of renewable energies, coal still accounted for 28 percent of the world's primary energy supply in 2017 4. As Pfeiffer et al. 5 point out, coal-fired power plants "will need to be underutilized, retired early, or retrofitted […] or-in short-stranded" (p. 7) if countries are serious about reaching the targets set out in Paris. Users may view, print, copy, and download text and data-mine the content in such documents, for the purposes of academic research, subject always to the full Conditions of use:

Policies to phase out fossil fuel cars are key to averting dangerous and irreversible changes to the earth's climate. Given the potential impacts of such policies on every-day routines and behaviours, the factors that might increase or decrease their public acceptance require investigation. Here we study the role of specific policy design features in shaping Americans' preferences for policy proposals to phase out fossil fuel cars. In light of the urgency of action against climate change, we are specifically interested in citizens' preferences with respect to the timing of phase-out policies.Based on a demographically representative sample of 1,520 American residents rating 24,320 hypothetical policy scenarios in a conjoint experiment, we find that Americans prefer phase-out policies to be implemented no later than 2030. Policy features other than timing are also important:higher policy costs significantly reduce public support; subsidies for alternative technologies are preferred over taxes and bans; and policy co-benefits in terms of pollution reduction increase public support only when they are substantial. The study also investigates the role of individual characteristics in shaping policy preferences, finding that perceived psychological distance of climate change and party identification influence policy preferences. The results of this study have important implications for the political feasibility of rapid decarbonization initiatives like the 'Green New Deal'that are now being discussed in the US and beyond. Among these is the insight that smart sequencing of policies (early implementation of subsidies for low-emission technologies, followed by tax increases and/or bans) might help ensure majority support for a fossil fuel car phase-out.

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