This paper aims to explain and discuss the complex nature and value of knowledge as an exploitable resource for business. Design/methodology/approachThe authors propose a conceptual explanation of knowledge based on three pillars: the plurality of its nature, understood to be conservative, multipliable and generative, its contextual value and the duality of carrier incorporating business knowledge, objects or processes. After conceptualizing the nature of knowledge, the authors offer a metaphor based on the classic transformation from "potential" to "kinetic" energy in an inclined plane assuming that the conservative nature of knowledge makes it act as energy. FindingsThe metaphor uses the concept of potential and kinetic energy: if energy is only potential, it has a potential value not yet effective, whereas if the potential energy (knowledge) becomes kinetic energy (products and/or services), it generates business value. In addition, business value is a function of the speed acquired and caused by the angle of inclined plan, namely, the company's business model. Knowledge is the source of the value and can be maintained and regenerated only through continuous investments. Several years later the value extraction reaches a null value of the company (potential energy) which will cease to act (kinetic energy) for triggering both the value generated and the value extracted. Originality/valueThe paper proposes an initial attempt to explain the meaning of the transformation of knowledge using a metaphor derived from physics. The metaphor of the energy of knowledge clearly depicts the managerial dilemma of balancing a company's resources for both the generating and extracting value. Similarly, future study should try to associate other knowledge peculiarities to physical phenomena.
"s conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim -reasons which derive from a general argument against "luminosity" -and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, whilst holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, by supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive conception of perceiving. In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for thinking that one"s justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such. I end by suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such. Keywords:McDowell; knowledge; perceiving; luminosity 1. There is a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil. How I do know this? Why, because I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil. That is to say, I take it that there is a man in front of me doing that, because my (visual) experience supplies me with a reason for taking it that this is so, in the shape of the fact that I see a man in front of me doing that. This is a truly excellent reason, for if I see a man in front of me doing that then there is a man in front of me doing that. Consequently, because I take it that this is so for this reason, I do not merely take it that this is so, but know that this is so -I know that there is a man in front of me, chewing on the end of his pencil.These are seemingly natural thoughts. But there is an argument -a variant on the Argument from Illusion 1 -which purports to show that they must be rejected.* Email: adrian.haddock@stir.ac.uk 2 It is possible that I have an experience "just like" the experience I have when I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil in a case in which there is no man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil. In a case like this, I could not see a man in front of me doing that, because there would be no man in front of me doing that; at best, I could dream of a pencil-chewing man, or have a hallucination of such a man.Here we have two possible cases: a "good" case, and a "bad" case. In the good case, I see a man in front of me chewing on the end of his pencil. And let us say that, in However, McDowell"s concern with experience"s capacity to supply me with reasons, and therefore with knowledge -which provided the central rationale for his conceptionis discarded by these recent writings, in favour of a quite different understanding of the idea of a fundamental difference between experiences which are "just like" one another.The thoughts with which these recent writings begin are harnessed by the moniker "naïve realism", and maintain that, when I see, e.g., a man in front of me McDowell"s central contention is that, if I enjoy perceptual k...
I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’.
is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism? A good way to answer this question is to consider the conceptions of experience advanced by Hinton, Snowdon, Martin, and McDowell. Snowdon's contribution to this volume offers an excellent introduction to Hinton's work. So, in this introduction, we will concentrate on the more well-known, and more influential, views of Snowdon, McDowell, and Martin. As we will see, these views have a number of features in common. But, as we will also see, these commonalities must not be allowed to obscure the equally important differences. In fact, the views of Snowdon, McDowell, and Martin serve to exemplify three distinct varieties of disjunctivism. It is not unusual, and not always unjustified, to speak of a position called 'disjunctivism', and to refer to each of the philosophers mentioned above as its advocates. But doing so carries the danger of eliding important differences and engaging in unjust criticism. To mention only three possibilities: disjunctivism about the nature of experience may be taken to task for failing to establish its epistemological advantages over alternative positions, when in fact it was never intended to have any such advantages; disjunctivism about the epistemic warrant that experience can provide will be attacked on the grounds that it is compatible with a causal theory of perception, when in fact it was never intended to oppose such a theory; and disjunctivism about experience's phenomenal character may be criticized for failing to undermine Cartesian scepticism, when in fact it had no such aim. It is because of the seriousness of these misunderstandings, and the apparent ease of falling into them, that this introduction takes the form that it does. Rather than offering a summary of each of the essays that appear in the volume, it presents in detail some key essays by Martin, McDowell, Snowdon, and others. In so doing it elucidates, compares, and provides a much-needed taxonomy of the ideas that are most often discussed under the disjunctivist heading, and makes clear which of the Many thanks are due to
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