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This paper studies the effect of independent directors' multiple directorships (MDs) on firm value and examines the countervailing effects of quality and "busyness." Using a unique panel data set covering all Hong Kong-listed firms, we find that despite independent directors' busyness, there is a strong and positive relation between the number of MDs of independent directors and firm value. We also find, however, that the positive effect of MDs declines at higher levels of busyness. We find that the effects of MDs on firm value are stronger under better corporate governance standards. We show that independent non-executive directors (INEDs) with a CEO position underperform because of busyness. After the requirement of increasing the minimum number of INEDs in Hong Kong from 2004, the quality effect of MDs seems to be reduced, implying the policy may have increased the busyness of some INEDs. Our results are robust to a range of estimation procedures, including alternative MD and firm-performance measurements, and 2SLS. Our empirical evidence suggests that highly engaged independent directors still improve firm value and supports increasing the minimum requirement for the fraction of independent directors, even under a supply constraint of qualified directors.

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We examine the impact of corporate fraud committed by one firm (the “fraudulent firm”) on other firms with interlocking directors (the “interlocked firms”), focusing on the debtholder side. We argue that the revelation of a fraudulent firm's fraud can damage the reputation of the interlocked firms because corporate governance can propagate via director interlocks. Empirically, we find that the interlocked firms' cost of debt is higher and the loan covenants become stricter after the fraud cases of the fraudulent firms are revealed. Consistent with the corporate governance propagation explanation, our results are weaker (stronger) for interlocked firms that have better (worse) pre‐event corporate governance standards. Our findings suggest that corporate fraud of fraudulent firms can affect other firms through director‐interlocks beyond shareholder value.

Purpose -The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of family control/ownership on auditor choice and audit fees in Hong Kong. Besides, this paper also addresses the impact of multiple directorship of audit committee members on these two external auditing dimensions. Findings -The results indicate that family firms have a higher likelihood to appoint Big 5 auditors, it supports the signaling hypothesis. Contrasting the perceived higher audit risk, they incur lower audit fees. The results also show the independent audit committee members with multiple directorships are not affected by their busyness. Our results are also robust to the alternative definition of family firms and by using the sub-sample within 2004 -2009. We also find that the firms controlled by recognized Big family in Hong Kong society incur higher audit fees but no support for family firm incurring higher non audit fee.

This study examines the effects of the Mandatory Call Events (MCEs) of Callable Bull/Bear Contracts (CBBCs) on the underlying stocks. The recent development of CBBCs in Hong Kong creates a unique opportunity to study this new derivative instrument. There are significant abnormal returns and volumes around MCEs. The substantial amount of price reversal after MCEs in both interday and intraday results supports the notion of stock price manipulation. Also, a greater outstanding number of issues in the market increases the chance of MCEs. We also show that the abnormal volume leads to the abnormal returns around MCEs, implying that abnormal trading activities can cause MCEs. This article shows that a market with a substantial amount of touch‐and‐out options trading may induce manipulation of the underlying stocks. Our study suggests that restricting issuers from unwinding hedged positions before the termination of exchange‐traded barrier options could improve investors' protection. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 35:1042–1066, 2015

This study examines the effects of the Mandatory Call Events (MCEs) of Callable Bull/Bear Contracts (CBBCs) on the underlying stocks. The recent development of CBBCs in Hong Kong creates a unique opportunity to study this new derivative instrument. There are significant abnormal returns and volumes around MCEs. The substantial amount of price reversal after MCEs in both interday and intraday results supports the notion of stock price manipulation. Also, a greater outstanding number of issues in the market increases the chance of MCEs. We also show that the abnormal volume leads to the abnormal returns around MCEs, implying that abnormal trading activities can cause MCEs. This article shows that a market with a substantial amount of touch-and-out options trading may induce manipulation of the underlying stocks. Our study suggests that restricting issuers from unwinding hedged positions before the termination of exchange-traded barrier options could improve investors' protection.